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Localizing Climate Change Action 
Myanna Dellinger* 
ABSTRACT 
Waiting for national- and supranational-level actors to 
reach a broadly based and substantively effective agreement on 
climate change mitigation is like waiting for Godot—unlikely to 
happen, at least at a substantively early enough point in time. 
The December 2012 negotiations under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
umbrella yet again demonstrated the problem in seeking widely 
accepted action from close to two hundred nations with widely 
divergent interests in climate change and the related underlying 
issues. This article adds new value to existing scholarship by 
conducting original research into select climate initiatives at the 
sub-national, sub-state level in order to find out whether it is 
worth pursuing climate change action at this level instead. The 
article posits that in times with little or severely delayed climate 
change action by national and supranational actors, it is worth 
pursuing climate change action at the local—but not the purely 
private—level. 
After identifying what “success” means in the climate 
change arena, the article analyzes the potential for both 
substantive and procedural success presented by select local 
initiatives. Some of these feature traditional adversarial 
enforcement methods, some feature modern collaborative-style 
enforcement, some feature no enforcement at all, and one is a 
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reporting program with mandatory implications. This article 
demonstrates how action at the scaled-down level can be 
effective whether traditional adversarial, or more collaborative 
goal enforcement methods are applied, and perhaps even if no 
enforcement methods are applied at all. 
The article builds on the author’s parallel project, An 
Unstoppable Tide: Creating Environmental and Human Rights 
Law from the Bottom Up.1 This article analyzes bottom-up, 
polycentric developments within national and international 
environmental and human rights law in general. It argues that 
bottom-up, polycentric action presents viable alternatives to 
traditional top-down action within these areas and presents a 
set of guidelines for the development and enforcement of law 
that apply to action within climate change and thus to this 
article as well. 
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Everybody talks about the weather, but nobody does 
anything about it.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fortunately, the above saying is no longer true. Some 
attempts have been and are made around the world to curb 
climate change.3 Unfortunately, these have produced very few 
actual, promising results so far.4 Numerous scholarly articles 
have been written lamenting the lack of effective action at, in 
particular, the state, national, or supranational level and 
discussing the need for local action instead.5 This article builds 
on such scholarship, but adds new value by conducting original 
research into select climate initiatives at the sub-national, sub-
state level in order to analyze whether it is worth pursuing 
                                                          
 2. Quote is commonly attributed to either Mark Twain or Charles 
Dudley Warner. 
 3. See, e.g., Plastic Bag Ban in LA Approved by City Council, Paper Bags 
to be 10 Cents, HUFFINGTON POST (May 23, 2012, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/23/plastic-bag-ban-la_n_1540478.html 
[hereinafter Plastic Bag Ban] (discussing Los Angeles’ efforts to encourage 
citizens not to use plastic bags); Andrew Winston, The Challenge of Climate 
Math, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2012, 11:04 AM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/andrew-winston/the-challenge-of-climate-_b_2189004.html 
(discussing different global efforts toward environmental conservation). 
 4. See Wynne Parry, UNEP Greenhouse Gas Emissions Report Finds 
Climate Change Goals Growing More Elusive, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 23, 
2012, 5:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/23/unep-greenhouse-
gas-emissions_n_2179270.html. 
 5. See, e.g., Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for 
Global Problems: State, Local, and Private Leadership in Developing 
Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 15, 16–28 (2004) (discussing the effectiveness of local 
government and private groups in filling the voids left the Federal 
Government in fighting climate change). 
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climate change action at this scale at all. To do so, the article 
analyzes the particular factors that are considered to make 
environmental law initiatives successful as well as risk factors 
of which both law and policymakers should be aware. The 
article is among the first to set forth a framework of reference 
for analyzing what “success” means in the environmental law 
context with a particular focus on climate change and to apply 
this framework to the analysis of programs to analyze whether 
they may be considered effective currently or have the potential 
for being so in the future. Since this appears to be the case for 
most programs, the article posits that in times with little or 
delayed climate change action by national and supranational 
actors, it is worth pursuing climate change action at the local—
but not the purely private—level. Further, the article shows 
how action at the scaled-down level can be effective whether 
traditional adversarial or more collaborative goal enforcement 
methods are applied, or perhaps even where no enforcement 
methods are applied at all. 
The article builds on the author’s parallel project, An 
Unstoppable Tide: Creating Environmental and Human Rights 
Law from the Bottom Up.6 The parallel article analyzes bottom-
up, polycentric developments within national and international 
environmental and human rights law.7 It posits that such 
action presents viable alternatives to traditional top-down 
action and describes why.8 The article presents value in the 
form of a set of guidelines from the human rights and 
environmental law arenas that can be applied to future 
developments of modern law in both arenas, but also in more 
specialized segments of the law such as climate change action.9 
As described in the author’s parallel article, clear comparisons 
between human rights and climate change can be drawn.10 For 
example, severe weather caused by climate change may affect 
our health and ultimately our lives, thus impacting the human 
rights to health and life. Our property rights may be at peril 
because of climate change as well.11 In 2008, the UN Human 
                                                          
 6. Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 2). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. (manuscript at 76–90). 
 10. Id. (manuscript at 38–41). 
 11. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change, 
Carbon Sequestration, and Property Rights, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 377–86 
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Rights Council officially recognized the fact that “climate 
change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people 
and communities around the world and has implications for the 
full enjoyment of human rights.”12 Accordingly, the principles 
for law creation, observance, and enforcement produced in the 
parallel article apply to the present article as well; as do the 
guidelines set forth in that article for effective law creation at 
the scaled-down and potentially non-governmental level. 
While we discuss what to do and how best to do it, the 
climate situation keeps getting more and more dire.13 We 
already let several precious years go by without any real 
progress in the area.14 The severity of this will be set forth in 
Part II by way of a brief factual background. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
This article takes the starting point that climate change 
exists, is manmade, and needs to be addressed effectively 
now—within a few years at the most—in order to avoid severe 
planetary effects. The article will thus not re-discuss that body 
of knowledge other than providing the following update of the 
state of scientific, economic, and legal affairs to demonstrate 
the now extreme urgency of the problem. 
A. THE SCIENCE 
In May 2012, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s (NOAA) National Climatic Data Center 
released a report showing that the average temperature in the 
United States between March and May was 57.1ºC, which is 
5.2ºC above the long-term average from 1901 to 2000.15 Before 
                                                          
(discussing issues that may arise as carbon sequestration becomes an 
attractive solution to limit the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, 
and specifically pointing out the property issues that arise when the 
government wants to store the carbon dioxide in pores beneath citizens’ land). 
 12. Human Rights and Climate Change, Human Rights Council, 7th 
Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/L.21/Rev.1 (Mar. 26, 2008). 
 13. See generally Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math, 
ROLLING STONE, Aug. 2, 2012, at 52, 53–60 (discussing the climate goals that 
must at a minimum be met and why that might not even be enough); Parry, 
supra note 4. 
 14. See Parry, supra note 4 (pointing out that as countries continue to 
make pledges to lower carbon emissions, the gap between those pledges and 
the level of reductions to cap global warming at 2ºC is widening, and that 
greenhouse gas emissions may already be at such a high level that we may not 
be able to avert the worst consequences of global warming). 
 15. Michael Pearson & Phil Gast, More Record Warmth as Scientists Warn 
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May 2012, the United States experienced twelve consecutive 
months with temperatures in the top third of recorded monthly 
average temperatures.16 The odds of that happening randomly 
are 1 in 540,000.17 Globally, the average April 2012 
temperature was 1.17ºC warmer than the average from the 
past century.18 That was the 327th consecutive month that 
global temperatures exceeded the 20th century average.19 The 
odds of that happening by simple chance are higher “than the 
number of stars in the universe.”20 NASA scientist James 
Hansen, the “Godfather of Global Warming,”21 states that the 
likelihood of temperatures similar to the global heat waves of 
recent years was rarer than 1 in 300 from the 1950s through 
the 1980s.22 Now, the odds are closer to 1 in 10.23 Mr. Hansen 
stated that “statistically what’s happening is not random or 
normal, but pure and simple climate change.”24 The United 
States Supreme Court and at least two United States Courts of 
Appeals have taken note of this.25 
                                                          
of Global Tipping Point, CNN.COM (June 8, 2012, 5:37 PM), 
http://articles.cnn.com/ 2012-06-08/us/us_record-warmth_1_climate-change-
noaa-nature-article?_s=PM:US. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. McKibben, supra note 13, at 52 (this figure was based on 327 
consecutive months of above average temperatures including May 2012). 
 21. New Study Links Current Events to Climate Change, 
INDEPENDENTMAIL.COM (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.independentmail.com/ 
news/2012/aug/04/new-study-links-current-events-climate-change/?print=1. 
 22. Doyle Rice, NASA Scientist Ties Heat Waves to Global Warming, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 4, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/weather/climate/ 
globalwarming/story/2012-08-04/heat-waves-climate-change-james-
hansen/56794570/1. 
 23. Id. 
 24. New Study Links Current Events to Climate Change, supra note 21. 
 25. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504–05 (2007) (noting 
that in recent decades, “[a] well-documented rise in global temperatures has 
coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of [greenhouse gases] 
in the atmosphere”); Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 
102, 120–21 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (similarly relying on the EPA’s “substantial 
scientific evidence” showing that “anthropogenically induced climate change 
threatens both public health and public welfare” and commenting that “[t]his 
is how science works, and, additionally, the EPA is not required to re-prove 
the existence of the atom every time it approaches a scientific question”); 
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil, 696 F.3d 849, 857, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(referring to the “dire circumstance” in which the village of Kivalina finds 
itself because of the rising sea level caused by climate change, but relying on 
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What must be done about this problem? The 2007 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Synthesis 
Report stated that to keep the global average temperature 
increase from pre-industrial levels within 2–2.4ºC, carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions must be reduced by 50–85% from 2000 
levels by 2050 and peak by 2015.26 The “167 countries 
responsible for more than 87 percent of the world’s carbon 
emissions have signed on to the Copenhagen Accord, endorsing 
the two-degree target,” which is just about “the only thing 
about climate change that the world has settled on.”27 The 2012 
Doha agreement reached under the auspices of the United 
Nations Framework Conference for Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
reaffirmed the two degree target.28 But it is looking more and 
more unlikely that goal can be met. For example, the 
concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has, according to a 
2012 UN report, jumped 20% since 2000.29 Additionally, an 
individual would have to have a footprint of no more than 1.1 
metric tons of CO2 from their direct energy use to allow for an 
80% reduction by 2050.30 As an illustration, individuals in the 
United States produced 18.6 metric tons of CO2 per person in 
2008.31 In total amounts, one calculation shows that global 
                                                          
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2011) in holding 
that relief must come from the legislative and executive branches of the 
government, not the courts via federal common law nuisance claims). 
 26. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 67 (R.K. Pachauri & A. Reisinger eds., 2007). In 
2011, the chief economist for the International Energy Agency projected that 
current global energy consumption levels put the Earth on a trajectory to 
warm by 6ºC above pre-industrial levels by 2100, an outcome he called “a 
catastrophe for all of us.” Juliet Eilperin, World on Track for Nearly 11-Degree 
Temperature Rise, Energy Expert Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/world-on-track-for-
nearly-11-degree-temperature-rise-energy-expert-
says/2011/11/28/gIQAi0lM6N_story.html (mentioning the “2 degree” goal). 
 27. McKibben, supra note 13, at 55. 
 28. Ban Welcomes Outcome of UN Climate Change Talks in Doha, UNITED 
NATIONS NEWS CENTRE (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/ 
story.asp?NewsID=43716#.UMjE1454VW4. 
 29. Karl Ritter, 2012 UN Climate Talks in Doha, Qatar Face Multiple 
Challenges, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 25, 2012, 10:51 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/25/2012-un-climate-talks-
qatar_n_2188048.html. 
 30. RACHEL HOWELL, UK ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE, THE EXPERIENCE 
OF CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS: IMPLICATIONS FOR A PERSONAL 
CARBON ALLOWANCES POLICY 19 (2009), available at http://www.eci.ox.ac.uk/ 
publications/downloads/howell09crags.pdf. 
 31. CO2 Emissions, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
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anthropogenic emissions must be reduced to approximately 44 
metric gigatons of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e) by 2020 to stay 
within the 2ºC goal.32 However, at the end of 2009, total global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions amounted to 49.5 GtCO2e.33 
The emissions gap between what is necessary to avoid 
catastrophic climate change and projected emissions continues 
to widen instead of narrow.34 Thus, it may already have become 
unrealistic to strive for “only” a 2ºC limit.35 Indeed, a recent 
World Bank projection showed that temperatures are more 
likely to increase up to 4ºC by the end of this century over pre-
industrial times, thus overshooting the target on which most 
UN talks have been based so far.36 The chief economist of the 
International Energy Agency cites to evidence showing that 
temperatures are likely to rise by 11ºC, “which would create a 
planet straight out of science fiction.”37 In fact, temperatures 
have already risen by almost 0.8ºC and, because of previously 
released carbon is likely to rise another 0.8ºC, the world is 
already three-quarters of the way to the “bottomest of bottom 
lines” two-degree target.38 The world can afford to add only 
approximately “565 more gigatons of carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere by midcentury and still have some reasonable hope 
of staying below two degrees. (‘Reasonable,’ in this case, means 
four chances in five, or somewhat worse odds than playing 
Russian roulette with a six-shooter.)”39 
B. THE ECONOMY 
The above description paints a very bleak picture of the 
state of affairs and the uphill battle to be fought. Perhaps it is 
already too late to realistically hope for effective mitigation of 
                                                          
EN.ATM.CO2E.PC (last visited Feb. 12, 2013) (showing per capita emission 
levels reflecting the burning of fossil fuels and manufacture of cement by 
nation and year). 
 32. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, BRIDGING THE 
EMISSIONS GAP: A UNEP SYNTHESIS REPORT 9, 16 (2011), available at 
http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_bridging_gap.pdf. 
 33. Id. at 15. 
 34. Parry, supra note 4. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Ritter, supra note 29. 
 37. McKibben, supra note 13, at 55. 
 38. Id. at 54–55. 
 39. Id. at 55. 
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the problem.40 Perhaps adaptation is the best we can do at this 
point in time.41 However, the problem is too severe to simply 
give up even trying.42 Further, relatively sudden and effective 
turn-arounds of severe scientific and moral problems of 
international importance have been seen before. For example, 
extensive campaigning in the 1980s demanded and obtained 
financial divestment from companies doing business in South 
Africa because of the apartheid problem.43 Currently, 
campaigns against sweat shops and child labor appear to add 
leverage against companies acquiring products produced in 
morally reprehensible ways.44 The ozone layer problem was 
virtually resolved by the Montreal Protocol in a relatively short 
amount of time.45 However, one major difference between the 
ozone depletion problem and climate change is that with the 
ozone problem, President Reagan embraced aggressive action 
at an early point in time to solve the problem because of a belief 
in the cost-benefit analysis which, at bottom, made action 
cheaper than inaction.46  In contrast, the financial advantages 
of taking action against climate change have not yet become 
persuasive, at least in the United States, although one can 
hope that this will change with more awareness of the financial 
benefits of taking action.47 For example, the size of the “climate 
economy” is estimated to be $2.2 trillion by 2020.48 Other 
countries are taking note of this: China’s budget for energy 
                                                          
 40. See Parry, supra note 4. 
 41. See McKibben, supra note 13, at 57 (“Changes to weather patterns 
that move crop-production areas around – we’ll adapt to that.” (quoting Exxon 
CEO, Rex Tillerson)). 
 42. See, e.g., Parry, supra note 4 (discussing the importance of avoiding a 
4°C jump, and noting that although difficult, it is still possible to avoid). 
 43. McKibben, supra note 13, at 60. 
 44. See generally B.J. Bullert, Strategic Public Relations, Sweatshops, and 
the Making of a Global Movement (Joan Shorenstien Ctr., Working Paper No. 
14, 2000), available at http://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/03/2000_14_bullert.pdf (discussing campaigns against Nike’s 
sweatshops). 
 45. See, e.g., Frances Beinecke, Solving the Ozone Layer: Lessons for 
Fighting Climate Change, NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Sept. 14, 2012), 
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/fbeinecke/saving_the_ozone_layer_lessons.ht
ml. 
 46. See Winston, supra note 3. 
 47. See McKibben, supra note 13, at 52–53 (observing the fact that 
President Obama chose not to attend the twentieth anniversary reprise of an 
environmental summit in Rio that was previously attended by President 
George H.W. Bush). 
 48. Winston, supra note 3. 
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conservation and anti-pollution measures over the next few 
years is $372 billion.49 In contrast, the global clean energy 
investment in 2011 was $260 billion.50 Saudi Arabia is 
planning to invest $109 billion in its solar industry over the 
next twenty years.51 Frequently cloudy Germany has, through 
early and focused investments, become the world leader in 
solar power whereas most parts of sunny America are only now 
rolling out solar programs, but arguably still only at a 
negligible scale given the abundance of the natural resource.52 
A very significant obstacle to climate change solutions is 
precisely the carbon economy and the companies, even nations, 
who are heavily invested in this.53 Whereas we can add only 
565 gigatons of fossil fuels to stay within the world recognized 
2ºC goal, the carbon contained in the proven coal, oil, and gas 
reserves of fossil-fuel companies and the countries that act as 
such—e.g., Venezuela and Kuwait—amounts to 2,795 gigatons; 
five times more than the “safe” limit.54 Those reserves are the 
primary assets—worth approximately $27 trillion—of oil 
companies, such as ExxonMobile or Lukoil.55 If the reserves of 
these firms were all to be burned, “[they] would use up more 
than a quarter of the remaining two-degree budget.”56 These 
companies are obviously not going to give up on such lucrative 
assets and further opportunities for growth in their fields, and 
are doing quite the opposite: in March 2012, “Exxon CEO Rex 
Tillerson told Wall Street analysts that the company plans to 
spend $37 billion a year through 2016 (about $100 million a 
day) searching for yet more oil and gas.”57 This industry alone 
holds the power to change the chemistry of our planet, and it is 
                                                          
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. (noting that during one sunny day in May, Germany was able 
to supply fifty percent of the nations required power through its solar energy 
network—a world record); see also Herman K. Trabish, Sunshot Program: 
Your Tax Dollars at Work Growing Solar, GREEN TECH MEDIA (Apr. 23, 2012), 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/SunShot-Program-Your-Tax-
Dollars-at-Work-Growing-Solar. 
 53. See Jeff Coelho, Analysis: Climate Impasse Could Kill Carbon Offset 
Investment, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2011, 12:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/10/31/us-cdm-investment-climate-idUSTRE79U4YA20111031. 
 54. McKibben, supra note 13, at 55–56. 
 55. Id. at 56. 
 56. Id. at 57. 
 57. Id. 
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planning to use it. As for the advice by the business sector in 
general as to what to do “if” scientists turn out to be correct, the 
position of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is simply that 
“populations can acclimatize to warmer climates via a range of 
behavioral, physiological and technological adaptations.”58 This 
problem is extreme indeed and clearly needs to be addressed 
somehow, whether through legislative action, hopeless as it 
may seem currently given the sheer strength of the carbon 
industry, or through investor-driven and other action. 
C. THE LACKING POLITICAL AND LEGAL ACTION 
Although time is running out quickly, there is still a very 
small window of time in which to act to attempt to avoid at 
least the very worst effects of climate change. However, taking 
beneficial advantage of this window will require swift and 
decisive action by a multitude of actors around the world at 
multiple scales. Until recently, focus was largely on national 
and multinational actors who were largely perceived to be “the 
only game in town.”59 The problem with climate change at that 
scale is, however, the continued lack of effective, promising 
action. The Kyoto Protocol only called for at least 5% GHG 
reductions by Annex I nations under the first commitment 
period;60 not nearly enough to effectively stem climate change 
according to current data.61 And although the Kyoto Protocol 
was extended from 2012 to 2020 at the 2012 Conference of 
Parties (COP 18) in Doha,62 only 37 out of the 191 parties to the 
UNFCCC now have legally binding emissions limitations and 
reduction commitments, representing only about 15% of global 
emissions.63 The Kyoto Protocol now mainly applies to the 
                                                          
 58. Id. at 58. 
 59. Thomas Gremillion, Setting the Foundation: Climate Change 
Adaptation at the Local Level, 41 ENVTL. L. 1221, 1229 (2011). 
 60. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, art. 3, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162. 
 61. See supra Part II.A. 
 62. Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further 
Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, Draft Decision, 
8th Sess., Nov. 26, 2012–Dec. 7, 2012, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9 
(Dec. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments]; 
Ban Welcomes Outcome of UN Climate Change Talks in Doha, UNITED 
NATIONS NEWS CENTRE (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/ 
story.asp?NewsID=43716#.UMjE1454VW4. 
 63. Ban Welcomes Outcome of UN Climate Change Talks in Doha, supra 
note 62; Karl Ritter & Michael Casey, UN Climate Conference: Kyoto Protocol 
Extended at Doha, Qatar Talks, HUFFINGTON POST (DEC. 8, 2012, 4:33 AM), 
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European Union (EU), Australia, and a few other countries who 
can choose their own emission targets.64 Previous 
industrialized signatories Japan, Russia, and Canada did not 
sign on to the extension.65 The United States signed but never 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol.66 Cautious hopes before Doha had 
been for a newly strengthened and legally binding agreement 
that would also apply to developing countries such as China 
and India, the world’s top and third largest carbon emitters, 
respectively.67 But at a time when the Kyoto Protocol should 
have been strengthened, it was left significantly weakened, 
although officially still alive.68 And although a “rough work 
plan” attempts to pave the way for a comprehensive, legally 
binding agreement by 2015, it would only take effect in 2020; 
years after carbon emissions should already have peaked.69 
After the Copenhagen, Durban, and Doha UNFCCC 
negotiations, there is thus—for good reason—wide and deep 
skepticism regarding the efficacy of large-scale international 
solutions to be implemented through national actors.70 
At the regional level, the EU has adopted relatively far-
reaching climate change reduction commitments—“cutting its 
emissions to 20% below 1990 levels” by 202071—but has 
                                                          
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/08/un-climate-conference-kyoto-doha-
qatar_n_2262371.html. 
 64. Tom Arup, Doha Climate Change Talks Delivered Little, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/environment/doha-
climate-change-talks-delivered-little-20121210-2b5oj.html. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNFCC, http://unfccc.int/ 
kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Mar. 23, 
2012); Michael A. Fletcher & Juliet Eilperin, Bush Proposes Talks on 
Warming, WASH. POST (May 31, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/31/AR2007053100934.html (“Bush refused to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which required industrialized nations to bring 
greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by 2012, calling the plan -- which 
excluded many fast-growing countries such as India and China -- 
unworkable.”). 
 67. Gopal Sharma, India Says is Now Third Highest Carbon Emitter, 
REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2010, 9:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/ 
04/us-india-climate-idUSTRE6932PE20101004. 
 68. Stephen Leahy, Doha Climate Summit Ends with No New CO2 Cuts 
or Funding, TRUTHOUT (Dec. 10, 2012, 2:16 PM), http://truth-out.org/news/ 
item/13254-doha-climate-summit-ends-with-no-new-co2-cuts-or-funding. 
 69. Arup, supra note 64. 
 70. See Ritter & Casey, supra note 63. 
 71. What is the EU Doing About Climate Change?, EUR. COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/index_en.htm (last updated Jan. 7, 
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admitted that because the EU is a relatively small group of 
emitters covering at the very most 14% of global emissions, it is 
not by itself going to make a significant difference in the fight 
against climate change.72 As for the largest emitters, the 
United States has only pledged to reduce its emissions by 17% 
below 2005 levels, but has never adopted any legally binding 
agreement at a national level.73 Further, the United States 
stated early on in the Doha negotiations that it would not 
increase its 17%-by-2020 target because “the scale and extent 
of [the United States’] effort . . . [is] enormous.”74 Similarly, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has only recently 
begun developing standards for GHG emissions from stationary 
and mobile sources, which will have some positive effect75 but 
likely not soon enough.76 China and India are still claiming a 
right to emit a significant amount of the total, although not per 
capita, amount of GHGs in order to develop and modernize.77 
Finger-pointing, passing the hot potato, and procrastination 
are still the name of the game at the national and 
supranational levels and may still be so for some time to come; 
time that just is not available if we want to avoid what experts 
fear will be extreme results.78 There is thus broad agreement 
among legal scholars that the international treaty regime and 
national action is currently not leading to effective progress 
against climate change.79 
Since the national and international climate change 
regimes are at least temporarily, and perhaps permanently, 
                                                          
2013). 
 72. Ritter, supra note 29. 
 73. Karl Ritter, UN Climate Boss: No Support for Tough Climate Deal, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Nov. 30, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/un-climate-boss-no-
support-tough-climate-deal-123816100.html. 
 74. US Defends “Enormous” Climate Efforts at UN Talks, CBS NEWS 
(Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-205_162-57554338/u.s-defends-
enormous-climate-efforts-at-u.n-talks/. 
 75. What is EPA Doing About Climate Change?, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities.html (last visited Feb. 6, 
2013). 
 76. See supra Part II.A. 
 77. Peter Singer, A Fair Deal on Climate Change, PROJECT SYNDICATE 
(June 10, 2007), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-fair-deal-on-
climate-change. 
 78. See supra Part II.A. 
 79. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”? 
Litigations’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 600 (2009) (“The 
international legal regime suffers from both a lack of political will and the 
complexities of national implementation.”). 
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dysfunctional, there is a clear need for action by lower-level 
structures. Whereas possible solutions at the scaled-up level 
would add to the picture, they are no longer considered “the 
only game in town”;80 in fact, quite far from it. A rapidly 
growing body of scholarship points to the emergence of a range 
of sub-state actors who are developing their own initiatives and 
approaches to climate change action.81 In one study, for 
example, more sub-states than actual states were taking 
climate change initiatives: out of fifty-eight experiments, only 
nine were nation states.82 Localized action is thus overtaking 
the importance of national and supranational climate change 
law. The next Part will analyze some such drivers of action. 
III. LOCAL CLIMATE CHANGE EXPERIMENTS 
New actors at both the local government and non-
governmental levels are surfacing and becoming the focus of 
attention in the climate change field.83 Because of the 
established lack of effective action by traditional actors, it is 
worth examining these non-traditional actors to examine 
whether they can be considered to be able to produce viable 
alternatives to more traditional action or whether they just add 
to an already increasingly fragmented, yet largely ineffective, 
climate governance system.84 For purposes of limitation, the 
focus of this article will be on action taken by select non-
emissions trading programs at the subnational level only. As 
one of the purposes of this article is to determine if scaled-down 
action within climate change may already have or promise to 
take on any legally binding nature where legally binding 
solutions at the national and supranational levels have largely 
failed to surface, the main focus of this article will focus on 
initiatives that voluntarily feature at least some mandatory 
aspects, broadly interpreted. Thus, the article will analyze 
                                                          
 80. Cf. Gremillion, supra note 59, at 1229 (quoting John Gummer) 
(defending the Kyoto Protocol as the “only game in town”). 
 81. See, e.g., Heike Schroeder & Harriet Bulkeley, Global Cities and the 
Governance of Climate Change: What is the Role of Law in Cities?, 36 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 313, 315 (2009). 
 82. MATTHEW J. HOFFMAN, CLIMATE GOVERNANCE AT THE CROSSROADS: 
EXPERIMENTING WITH A GLOBAL RESPONSE AFTER KYOTO 30–31 (2011). 
 83. See, e.g., STEINER ANDRESEN & LARS H. GULBRANDSEN, FRIDTJOF 
NANSEN INST., THE ROLE OF GREEN NGOS IN PROMOTING CLIMATE 
COMPLIANCE (2003), available at http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/rapp0403.pdf. 
 84. See supra Part II.C. 
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initiatives that apply “strict” accountability with traditional 
enforcement, programs with broader forms of accountability 
but no strict enforcement, and models with reporting 
requirements and regulatory implications but no enforcement 
per se. For comparison of possible efficiencies, however, some 
promising city coalition programs without any enforcement will 
also be analyzed. 
A. EXPERIMENTS WITH TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT METHODS 
The two initiatives analyzed below feature enforcement 
mechanisms under which actors are held strictly accountable if 
failing to meet their self-imposed but binding commitments. 
One experiment employs monetary fines, and the other 
employs expulsion from group membership for compliance 
failures. Such enforcement mechanisms more closely resemble 
traditional forms of compliance securement than some of the 
newer, collaborative experiments that will be analyzed later. 
Because the purpose of this article is to predict the possible 
future efficacy of non-traditional, local climate change 
experiments, the article does not critique the chosen degree of 
severity, or possible lack thereof, of the sanctions chosen by 
each initiative. The interesting aspects of the actual steps 
taken are to consider whether they might lead to any effect at 
all, not whether other types or degrees of sanctioning may be 
more effective than those chosen. Both the potential for 
procedural and substantive efficacies will be analyzed. 
1. EU Covenant of Mayors 
Urban activity is associated with “80% of energy 
consumption and CO2 emissions.”85 Against this background, 
the European Commission launched the Covenant of Mayors 
(Covenant) in 2008 to endorse and support the efforts deployed 
by local authorities to reduce their contributions to climate 
change.86 Covenant signatories aim to meet and exceed the 
EU’s target of 20% CO2 reductions by 2020.87 Some signatories 
voluntarily go much further than that. For example, the city of 
Halmstad, Sweden, has adopted a 45% reduction goal.88 
                                                          
 85. The Covenant of Mayors, COVENANT MAYORS, http://www. 
eumayors.eu/about/covenant-of-mayors_en.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. MUNICIPALITY OF HALMSTAD, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ACTION PLAN: 
STRATEGIC DOCUMENT FOR A SUSTAINABLE CONVERSION OF ENERGY IN 
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Through these goals, local authorities would contribute as 
much as one fifth of the total emissions reductions effort 
needed for the whole EU.89 
The Covenant is open to democratically constituted cities, 
whatever their stage of implementation of their existing energy 
and climate policies.90 Currently, the Covenant has no less than 
4,392 signatories representing over 168 million inhabitants.91 
Whereas the Covenant was initially open only to cities in 
Europe, it now offers membership to cities around the world.92 
Thus, in addition to the many EU members, numerous non-EU 
local authorities have joined the initiative including cities such 
as Buenos Aires, Argentina; Lviv, Ukraine; Osh, Kyrgyzstan; 
Fornelli, Cameroon; and Ushaia, Argentina, the southernmost 
city in the world.93 
The signatory cities plan to go beyond the objectives set by 
the EU through the use of individualized Sustainable Energy 
Action Plans (SEAPs) with follow-up implementation reports, 
by adapting city structures “in order to undertake necessary 
actions,” by mobilizing civil society to take part in developing 
the SEAPs, and by sharing “experience and know-how with 
other territorial units.”94 The action taken must cover at least 
three of the Covenant’s four key sectors: transportation; 
municipal buildings; tertiary buildings, equipment and 
facilities; and residential buildings.95 
If the CO2 reduction objectives set forth in the SEAP are 
not met, or if an SEAP is not submitted within the year 
following formal city adoption of the Covenant, the cities will be 
                                                          
HALMSTAD FOR 2010–2014, at 5 (2011), available at http://helpdesk. 
eumayors.eu/docs/seap/714_1329817723.pdf. 
 89. COVENANT OF MAYORS, TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE 4 (2011) 
[hereinafter TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE], available at 
http://www.eumayors.eu/IMG/pdf/brochure_com_web_FINAL_18_11_2011.pdf. 
 90. As a Local Authority, COVENANT MAYORS, http://www.eumayors.eu/ 
participation/as-a-local-authority_en.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). If cities 
are too small to prepare a GHG inventory or draft an action plan, they “should 
be supported by administrations who can.” COVENANT OF MAYORS, COVENANT 
OF MAYORS 4 (2008), available at http://www.eumayors.eu/IMG/pdf/ 
covenantofmayors_text_en.pdf. 
 91. COVENANT  MAYORS, http://www.eumayors.eu/index_en.html (last 
visited Mar.  23, 2013). 
 92. TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 89, at 9. 
 93. Id. 
 94. As a Local Authority, supra note 90, at 2. 
 95. TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 89, at 5. 
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terminated from program membership.96 “Signatories who fail 
to fulfill their commitments are temporarily suspended from 
the initiative until they can prove otherwise. In addition, the 
actual implementation of the SEAP is ensured by the biannual 
submission of a monitoring report.”97 
What motivates cities to undertake this type of 
commitment? Public relations are important. The cities are 
given a perceivably significant opportunity to make a public 
statement of extra commitments to CO2 reductions and thus to 
make their territories known as pioneers in climate change 
reduction efforts.98 Shared expertise, as well as the 
opportunities to benefit from EU endorsement and support, 
also factor in.99 Further, members may also qualify for various 
types of funding through the initiative.100 
According to the EU Commissioner for Climate, Ms. 
Connie Hedegaard, more than 2300 local authorities have 
already gone beyond the 2020 targets before the adopted 
deadline.101 This, of course, is significant. It is thus fair to label 
action at this level substantively successful, at least under the 
EU Covenant umbrella. It is also procedurally promising in 
that the program motivates a greater and greater number of 
local authorities and their private-citizen constituents to take 
joint action in developing and implementing action plans. 
2. Carbon Rationing Action Groups (CRAGs) 
The CRAG initiative began in England. CRAGs are 
composed of groups of private individuals who have committed 
to reducing their individual and collective carbon footprints.102 
“[T]he core idea behind CRAGs is that personal responsibility is 
key, and that lobbying the government is only half of the 
solution.”103 CRAGs have been compared to “Weight-Watchers  
 
 
                                                          
 96. As a Local Authority, supra note 90, at 2. 
 97. TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 89, at 5. 
 98. As a Local Authority, supra note 90. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 89, at 3. 
 102. Sarah Krakoff, Planetarian Identity Formation and the Relocalization 
of Environmental Law, 64 FLA. L. REV. 87, 115–16 (2012). 
 103. Jamie Andrews, A Rational Approach to Carbon, ECOLOGIST, Nov. 
2008, at 40, 40. 
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for the energy-conscious.”104 The aims of CRAG schemes are: 
1. To make us all aware of our personal CO2 footprint 
2. To find out if it can help us make radical cuts in our personal CO2 
emissions 
3. To help us argue for (or against!) the adoption of similar schemes at 
a national (DTQ) and/or international (C&C) [Contraction and 
Convergence] level 
4. To build up solidarity between a growing community of carbon 
conscious people 
5. To share practical lower-carbon-living knowledge and experience105 
In the United Kingdom (UK), there are as many as twenty 
active CRAGs with established rules and at least one carbon 
accounting year underway, as well as eleven start-ups that are 
still recruiting members or have not yet determined rules or 
started a carbon accounting year.106 In the United States, there 
are four established CRAGs and two startups.107 In Canada, 
one established CRAG and one startup exist, and China has 
one established CRAG.108 It should be noted that it is 
questionable whether all of these experiments are still truly 
active or not, and if so, what their level of activity is.109 In fact, 
some CRAG members have expressed doubt about whether 
their respective CRAGs are still fully functioning.110 Key 
members are examining strategies “to help the movement grow 
and continue to flourish.”111 At any rate, the CRAG scheme is 
worth briefly considering to glean the lessons that were, after 
all, produced even if the CRAG scheme has since stalled in 
some instances or to some extent. 
A CRAG consists of approximately 250–350 members.112 
The CRAGs either set an annual emissions target (a ration) in 
total amounts; for example, five metric tons of CO2 per person 
or a percentage-based cut in emissions compared to the 
previous year.113 Most British groups with a per capita target 
                                                          
 104. Id. at 42. 
 105. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 3. 
 106. Krakoff, supra note 102, at 117. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 4. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Andrews, supra note 103, at 43. 
 112. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 4. 
 113. Carbon Equity: What is a Carbon Rationing Group, CLIMATE ACTION 
CENTER, http://web.archive.org/web/20120618135932/http://climateactioncen 
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started with 4500 kilograms, an approximately 10% per annum 
reduction of the UK average for direct emissions.114 The 
rationale was that a 10% per annum reduction is what is 
needed to cut emissions by 90% by 2030, which is the UK’s fair 
share of the global reduction necessary to avoid warming of 
more than 2ºC.115 Most CRAGs operate with a target that is the 
same for each member at a certain emissions level; for example, 
a “25% reduction per year for those who start with a footprint 
of 15–20 tonnes, down to a 5% reduction for those who start 
with a footprint of 5 tonnes or lower.”116 Some CRAGs have 
differentiated obligations and some allow members to set their 
own targets.117 Some do not have a fixed ration at all.118 
Members keep track of their own emissions by keeping a record 
of household energy use and private car and plane travel.119 
The most noteworthy aspect of the CRAG initiative is that 
many of the groups impose penalties on noncompliant members 
without government mandates requiring such enforcement.120 
This self-imposition of traditional rule enforcement by non-
governmental groups is unique in the climate change 
framework.121 While national and supranational bodies still 
discuss whether any future schemes should be legally 
enforceable and, if so, how to implement such enforcement, 
these groups have already voluntarily taken on mechanisms 
with quasi-legal ramifications, thus showing a lack of 
opposition to traditionally styled norm enforcement in the 
climate change context, at least by some members of civil 
society.122 
The predominant design of the CRAG enforcement system 
is based on financial penalties.123 Of the active CRAGs listed in 
                                                          
tre.org/carbon-equity (last visited Jan. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Carbon Equity]. 
 114. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 11. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 10. 
 117. See id. 
 118. Id. at 4. 
 119. Carbon Equity, supra note 113. 
 120. See HOWELL, supra note 30, at 1–4; Andrews, supra note 103, at 40; 
Carbon Equity, supra note 113. 
 121. See generally Andrews, supra note 103, at 40–43 (describing CRAGs 
and highlighting their unique structure). 
 122. See generally Andrews, supra note 103, at 43 (“CRAGs is a practical 
implementation of a well-researched policy . . . . We are testing it out and 
seeing how it works in practice.” (quoting David Bassendine)). 
 123. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 13. 
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one report, fourteen have a financial penalty for exceeding the 
carbon target, ranging from two pence to ten pence per 
kilogram.124 Many groups cap the penalty at £100 per year and 
“[t]wo CRAGs allow over-emitters to do voluntary work in lieu 
of paying the financial penalty.”125 Seven CRAGs chose not to 
have a penalty at all.126 Only two CRAGs operate a carbon 
“trading” scheme, “where under-emitters receive payments 
from over-emitters.”127 Instead, six CRAGS give monies “from 
over-emitters to carbon reduction projects, environmental 
charities, or other ‘good causes.’”128 A few have yet to decide 
what to do with the penalties paid by the over-emitters, but 
appear to be considering funding carbon offsetting projects or 
environmental groups instead of financially rewarding under-
emitters.129 Finally, not all CRAG participants (CRAGers) 
attribute the changes in their carbon consumption patterns to 
their involvement with the CRAG scheme.130 Although some do 
not so connect their behavioral patterns to CRAG involvement, 
the mere fact that they are members of a CRAG has doubtlessly 
had an effect on their thinking, which is significant too. 
The psychology of penalties in the carbon context is 
relevant to considerations of whether action of this nature and 
at this level has the potential for being substantively 
efficient.131 First, many CRAGers did not think that the 
financial penalty applied had actually changed their carbon 
consuming behavior, in part because the penalties are too 
small.132 One person said about a potentially larger penalty: “It 
would focus my mind. I wouldn’t be content to just let things 
drift and think if it’s a little bit I’ll pay. I would have to actually 
sit down and work it out and that would be good.”133 
The embarrassment factor should also be considered: some 
people feel embarrassed about receiving money from fellow 
CRAGers, but not from larger, unknown sources.134 Thus, just 
                                                          
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 19. 
 131. Id. at 5, 14–16. 
 132. Id. at 14–15. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 16. 
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over 50% of the interviewees in one study expressed “qualified 
to enthusiastic” support for the introduction of a national 
personal carbon accounting scheme in the UK.135 One of the 
main reasons for such support is that a national plan would 
still take the form of a redistributive policy, but one in which 
the incentive is having to pay money to a large and relatively 
anonymous entity rather than gaining money from a small 
group whose members more closely identify with one 
another.136 The embarrassment factor is not perceived as being 
a barrier in a national scheme because, as one CRAGer stated, 
“[T]here wouldn’t be this ‘I’m doing it to you my neighbour’ sort 
of factor.”137 
So far, a few CRAGs have been able to create some 
substantively promising results. Members of some groups 
reduced their footprints by 27%, from 4.9 tonnes to 3.6 tonnes, 
just in their first year of membership.138 The 3.6 metric tons 
footprint is 31% below the UK average of 5.2 metric ton for 
direct carbon emissions.139 The average baseline footprint of 
CRAGers was only “6% below the UK average.”140 Thus, the 
members were not already at a significant advantage or 
disadvantage when starting.141 
It is important to consider what motivates individuals to 
comply with mandates that have been imposed on them from 
the top down or that they have imposed upon themselves in 
order to attempt to identify the most promising solutions for 
possible future program emulation. The motivation to observe 
binding mandates comes in many forms.142 Financial and other 
traditional, adversarial style penalties are just few of several 
possibly effective drivers.143 Equally important are 
considerations such as: (1) whether the mandates or laws are 
seen as sound and necessary from both a personal and social 
point of view, (2) whether they have been adopted with public 
participation by trustworthy bodies of authority, and (3) 
                                                          
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 16. 
 138. Id. at 18–19. 
 139. Id. at 19. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See generally id. at 8–9 (discussing the variety of motives that lead 
individuals to join CRAGs). 
 143. See id. at 13–17 (discussing the many approaches to incentivize 
attaining one’s own carbon reduction goal taken by various CRAGs). 
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whether they are considered important symbolically as a 
statement of the direction in which constituents and 
stakeholders should move.144 
In the CRAG context, this means that it may actually not 
be the penalties that motivate members to reduce their carbon 
emissions. It may just as well be that CRAGers—who by 
definition are highly environmentally conscious people145—
believe in the soundness of reducing carbon emissions to begin 
with, and would thus have been just as or almost just as likely 
to act even without a financial deterrent.146 Although it is 
difficult to separate just one motivation from a possible 
multitude of causes leading to any given desired effect, it is still 
important to monitor whether experiments with strict 
accountability and penalties for excessive carbon emissions 
will, over time, lead to more comprehensive and promising 
patterns of carbon reduction than comparable groups without 
traditional enforcement mechanisms. 
It is also important to remember that it cannot be assumed 
that the experiences of some CRAGers will expand to the 
general population as a whole, in the UK, or elsewhere, should 
a national, compulsory, personal carbon accounting scheme be 
instigated; CRAGers still only represent a limited segment of 
the general population. However, their results do suggest some 
interesting issues to consider. For example, whether fixed 
carbon rations or targets may prove viable, how carbon 
accounting should be accomplished, and what type of 
enforcement methods should be applied to subnational or 
national rationing initiatives, if any. 
In sum, the CRAG model appears relevant to climate 
change efforts, but only as an addition to broader schemes. This 
is mainly because doubt exists as to whether these groups are 
truly active anymore and, if so, whether any significant work is 
being undertaken under the CRAG umbrella.147 If CRAGs 
                                                          
 144. For more information on the recognized advantages of public 
participation, see Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 21–29). 
 145. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 7 (“In general, the CRAGers interviewed 
could be informally described (and some did describe themselves) as ‘the usual 
green suspects.’”). 
 146. Id. at 7–9 (detailing CRAGers’ motivations for involvement—many of 
which were based in environmentally conscientious  ideals). 
 147. See id. at 4 (“[M]embers of two of [the twenty-four active UK CRAGs] 
expressed doubt when interviewed about whether their CRAG was still 
functioning.”). 
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reappear as active, fully legitimate actors in the climate change 
arena, it would become relevant to continue attempting to 
verify whether the members take action because of the model or 
whether they would have done so anyway for personally 
convincing reasons. It would also be necessary to follow up on 
the efficacy of self-imposed penalties on group members. 
Whereas action scaled down to the purely individual, 
voluntary micro-level thus appear to be largely insufficient as a 
stand-alone model at this point in time,148 some important 
lessons can still be derived from the CRAG initiative. First, 
clear information,149 targets,150 and intergroup support151 are a 
must at this level of action. Second, differentiated 
responsibilities are needed allowing members to individualize 
their carbon rationing goals,152 at least within some parameters 
and to some extent. Third, flexibility and dynamism are key.153 
Accordingly, whereas on the one hand carbon reduction targets 
should be clear, the supervising authorities (whether non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) or government entities) 
should, on the other hand, consider the benefits of granting 
participants some leeway in meeting the targets while still 
upholding clear overall goals to drive the action forward. This 
is a fine balance to strike, but an important one. Fourth, having 
sanctions may be more substantively effective than having 
none.154 If sanctions are monetary in nature, payments and 
transfers of funds should be overseen by bodies of more 
traditional authority, such as governments or larger, more 
established groups than smaller NGOs such as CRAGs. This is 
because of the embarrassment factor mentioned above.155 In 
                                                          
 148. See id. at 26–28 (discussing the limitations of CRAGs). 
 149. See id. at 17–18 (highlighting the value of increased information 
regarding personal emission levels). 
 150. See id. at 10–11 (showcasing the role of a variety of target-setting 
methods within CRAGs). 
 151. See id. at 23–26 (discussing the significance of the group aspect of 
CRAGs). 
 152. See generally id. at 35 (highlighting the issue of how much of an 
allowance to give to households with children as an example of the necessary 
tailoring of CRAG approaches). 
 153. Andrews, supra note 103, at 42 (“CRAGs let individuals chose their 
own path to carbon reduction . . . . That flexibility is key to the group 
dynamic.” (quoting CRAG member, Guy Shrubsole)). 
 154. Cf.  HOWELL, supra note 30, at 13 (“Of the 24 ‘active’ CRAGs listed on 
the website, 14 definitely have a financial penalty for exceeding the carbon 
target . . . .”). 
 155. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text. 
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general, the peer pressure factor does appear to instigate action 
at the scaled-down level. For example, one CRAGer stated: 
If one group member feels the need to take a flight for a particular 
reason others in the group can effectively sanction it by ensuring that 
the group target is not exceeded. This is an important concept to 
explore given that climate change affects us all, no matter who is 
responsible for the carbon being released into the atmosphere.156 
Last, but not least, bottom-up action is widely considered 
necessary to successful climate change efforts.157 By their very 
nature, CRAGs demonstrate how such action may spring forth 
at the very bottom of traditional law- and policy-development 
hierarchies.158 This low level of action is not one typically 
looked to for action and may not yield sufficient substantive 
progress without the synergic effects that can be obtained 
through an interface to other larger-scaled areas of action,159 
but procedurally, CRAGs have added value to the 
environmental discourse.160 
B. EXPERIMENTING WITH COLLABORATIVE ENFORCEMENT 
METHODS 
This section analyzes Climate Savers, an initiative with no 
traditional adversarial-style enforcement mechanisms.161 
Instead, this initiative features accountability in the form of 
monitoring and independent verification combined with 
secondary implementation requirements.162 This type of 
enforcement is more collaborative than traditional approaches 
with more authoritative and, in some cases, even adversarial 
approaches.163 It is also one promoted in and applied in some 
                                                          
 156. Andrews, supra note 103, at 42 (emphasis added). 
 157. See Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 24). 
 158. See Andrews, supra note 103, at 40. 
 159. See generally HOWELL, supra note 30, at 33. 
 160. See generally Andrews, supra note 103, at 43 (discussing the current 
value and potential future of CRAGs). 
 161. WWF CLIMATE SAVERS, DISCOVER THE BENEFITS OF LEADERSHIP 
WITH WWF CLIMATE SAVERS 5–9 (2012) [hereinafter DISCOVER THE 
BENEFITS], available at  http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/461/files/ 
original/A5_brochure_Climate_Savers_120701.pdf?1348776926. 
 162. See WWF Climate Savers Companies Cut 100 Million Tonnes of 
Greenhouse Gases, WWF (May 9, 2012), http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/ 
?204638/WWF-Climate-Savers-companies-cut-100-million-tonnes-of-
greenhouse-gases [hereinafter WWF Climate Savers Companies]. 
 163. DISCOVER THE BENEFITS, supra note 161, at 5 (“The process begins 
with a consultation between the prospective member company and an 
independent technical expert. Together, we explore what it would entail for 
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environmental treaty contexts such as the Facilitative Branch 
of the UNFCCC and the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe Aarhus Convention.164 
Climate Savers is a World Wildlife Fund (WWF)-run 
platform for corporations wishing to undertake voluntary 
sector-leading targets regarding their own GHG emissions as 
well as to cooperate with other companies in the 
implementation of innovative solutions for a low carbon 
economy.165 Climate Savers started as a two-year experiment 
meant mainly to be an advocacy tool, but is now “one of the 
most ambitious and credible climate business engagement 
programmes in the world.”166 Members include established 
corporate giants such as Nike, Johnson & Johnson, IBM, Novo 
Nordisk, and Sony.167 
The members set their own reductions goals tailored to the 
specific circumstances and operating sector of each member 
company.168 The goals are set in absolute terms for defined 
timeframes.169 Climate Savers writes a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) for the participants, who commit 
themselves in writing to an action plan.170 If that plan cannot 
be implemented, a secondary action plan will be drafted.171 The 
program uses what is known as “stretch targets,” under which 
companies undertake reductions goals that go a few 
percentages further than that with which the companies are 
comfortable.172 This is done in order to challenge the companies 
to not just meet, but to exceed even their own expectations and 
comfort levels.173 The MOU is written by the WWF and 
stipulates that Climate Savers will issue a public statement 
about the compliance challenges and an action plan to remedy 
any gaps that may arise.174 Compliance review is conducted by 
                                                          
your company to be sector-leading in carbon efficiency and how your company 
can go beyond its existing or previously planned emission reduction targets.”). 
 164. See Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 45–46). 
 165. DISCOVER THE BENEFITS, supra note 161, at 3. 
 166. Id. at 5; Telephone Interview with Matthew Banks, Senior Program 
Officer, Climate Change, WWF US (June 27, 2012). 
 167. DISCOVER THE BENEFITS, supra note 161, at 11. 
 168. Id. at 5. 
 169. Id. at 5. 
 170. Telephone Interview with Matthew Banks, supra note 166. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Email from Matthew Banks, Senior Program Officer, Climate Change, 
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the independent third party Ecofys.175 
The goals are publicly communicated and will result in 
pressure to comply from the global community.176 Among other 
things, the companies have to report progress every year at a 
global summit in front of their peers, adding pressure to 
comply.177 The members’ relationship with Climate Savers is, 
however, non-adversarial and there are no penalties for non-
compliance.178 This type of oversight and public awareness is 
thus not unlike the “naming and shaming” enforcement method 
already known in international law contexts, although typically 
one that is used against nation states, not private actors as 
here.179 
What drives the participants to undertake relatively far-
reaching goals such as those under the Climate Savers program 
even without government requirements? A noteworthy aspect 
of this program is that the commonly perceived public relations 
advantage of being seen as “green” does not motivate all 
companies to act. According to Senior Program Officer Matthew 
Banks, the members participate mainly out of a sense of 
obligation.180 They do not want to be associated with the 
negative tenets of environmentalism such as the BP and 
“greenwashing” scandals of recent years.181 This counters the 
otherwise common criticism that companies are more 
interested in the public relations advantages to be derived from 
carbon reduction efforts than in any substantive results. This 
may well be the case for some, but as shown, it does not hold 
true for all. Among other motivational factors are strong and 
positive brand images, increased networking opportunities, 
improved business performance through energy savings, and 
                                                          
WWF US, to Myanna Dellinger, Assistant Professor of Law, W. State Coll. of 
Law (June 27, 2012) (on file with author); Email from Matthew Banks, Senior 
Program Officer, Climate Change, WWF US, to Myanna Dellinger, Assistant 
Professor of Law, W. State Coll. of Law (Dec. 14, 2012) (on file with author). 
 175. WWF Climate Savers Companies, supra note 162. 
 176. Telephone Interview with Matthew Banks, supra note 166. 
 177. Email from Matthew Banks, supra note 174. 
 178. Telephone Interview with Matthew Banks, supra note 166. 
 179. Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritt, International Organizations and 
Government Killings: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives?, 38 INT’L 
INTERACTIONS 1, 2 (2012) (defining naming and shaming as “policy of 
punishment by publicity”). 
 180. Telephone Interview with Matthew Banks, supra note 166. 
 181. Id. 
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improved risk management through reduced energy 
dependence.182 These companies also recognize that “cutting 
carbon emissions and spurring economic growth can go hand in 
hand.”183 Further, the program acts as a “sounding board, 
providing valuable guidance for companies seeking to 
substantially reduce their carbon footprints while growing their 
businesses and enhancing their brand equity.”184 
The collaborative enforcement methodology of the program 
can also be measured against notions of corporate social 
responsibility, pursuant to which some companies just might 
act because it is the “right” thing to do.185 In this context, 
carbon reduction action is undoubtedly not only taken for the 
sake of acting in what is modernly perceived to be 
environmentally sound ways, but also driven by interests in 
reducing energy consumption to save money. This is partly 
because corporations realize that government regulations are 
inevitable in the long run anyway, and for fears of potential 
government or shareholder lawsuits for failure to act 
reasonably in an area in which the law is undergoing change in 
directions that are not yet fully predictable. One stakeholder 
said, “It doesn’t actually matter whether a board believes in 
climate change, ‘cos [sic] climate change believes in them and 
they have no choice but to ensure that they are seen to be 
taking effective action on climate change.”186 Thus, whereas 
some corporations claim that they are not taking action 
because of any perceived public relations advantages, it is clear 
that for others, the perceived negative implications of non-
compliance is a factor in program compliance. 
It is fair to describe Climate Savers as a success. By May 
2012, member companies have cut 100 million tonnes of GHGs 
in direct and indirect emissions, which corresponds to twice the 
current annual emissions of Switzerland.187 One example of 
effects reached through the program is Johnson & Johnson. 
This company’s “climate change goal was to reduce its baseline 
                                                          
 182. DISCOVER THE BENEFITS, supra note 161, at  6–7. 
 183. Id. at 3. 
 184. Id. 
 185. For more information about why civil society observes norms that are 
considered morally sound, although perhaps not mandated by positive law, see 
Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4–8). 
 186. Heike Schroeder & Harriet Bulkeley, Global Cities and the 
Governance of Climate Change: What is the Role of Law in Cities?, 36 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 313, 340–41 (2009). 
 187. WWF Climate Savers Companies, supra note 162. 
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1990 CO2 emission levels [for its facilities] by 7 percent by the 
end of 2010.”188 When that target was initially adopted, the 
company considered it very hard to reach. Nonetheless, the 
company not only achieved, but exceeded the goal by achieving 
a 23% reduction at the end of 2010.189 Simultaneously, the 
company experienced a sales growth of approximately 450%.190 
At the end of 2011, Johnson & Johnson realized a more modest 
4.9% reduction in CO2 emissions while still realizing a 5.5% 
increase in sales.191 In regards to its transportation-related 
emissions, the company has announced two related goals: a 
five-year goal of reducing the CO2 emissions to 142 
grams/kilometer per vehicle, which it is on track to achieve,192 
and to realize a 20% improvement in its overall fleet emissions 
efficiency for its global inventory of over 28,000 vehicles.193 For 
its overall energy use, however, the company states only that it 
“will continue to follow The Greenhouse Gas Protocol issued by 
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and 
the World Resources Institute” whose goals are not 
transparent.194 Other companies, although not members of 
Climate Savers, have also managed to reduce energy 
consumption in tough financial times (perhaps precisely 
because of such times). As two examples, “Dow Chemical has 
decreased its energy costs $9 billion since 1994,”195 and 
“Walmart has increased the fuel efficiency of its distribution 
fleet by 69% since 2005.”196 There is thus reason for cautious 
optimism that some companies will proactively and voluntarily 
seek to reduce their emissions without traditional legal 
requirements. 
                                                          
 188. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, 2011 RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 29 (2011), 
available at http://www.jnj.com/wps/wcm/connect/e265d6804bc83ae392f6ffbf 
30c50c56 /2011-responsibilty-report.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 31. 
 193. Id. at 30. 
 194. Id. at 29.  The emission reduction goals of this program are not clear, 
which casts some doubt on the ultimate willingness of the participating 
corporate members in taking effective action and not just reiterating more or 
less empty rhetoric. See About the GHG Protocol, GREENHOUSE GAS 
PROTOCOL, http://www.ghgprotocol.org/about-ghgp (last visited Feb. 13, 2013) 
(describing the GHG Protocol). 
 195. Winston, supra note 3. 
 196. Id. 
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The Climate Savers initiative shows several important 
aspects of non-governmental action against climate change 
under the auspices of an established, reputable organization. 
First, strict oversight by a third party of claims of 
environmental advances by corporations is needed to avoid 
“greenwashing” or the appearances thereof. Of course, it is 
impossible to prevent companies from producing self-
interested, yet largely untrue promotional statements to boost 
their image and sales.197 It is precisely for this reason that 
membership of and accountability through organizations such 
as Climate Savers is an advantage both to those companies 
that actually intend to take relevant action and to the outside 
world. Strict or traditional enforcement of organizational goals 
may actually not be needed to ensure goal compliance; softer 
oversight methods with assistance in reaching the adopted 
goals may be equally effective. Considerations of public 
relations are still key  in this context as shown both by the 
interest of some in being seen as part of the green movement 
and, similarly but for the opposite reason, the interest of some 
in not being associated with that movement because of recent 
perceived, although arguably not always factually correct, 
scandals rocking the environmental movement. 
Of course, the most important issue in the corporate 
context is not so much whether some companies actually mean 
well and truly intend to reduce their carbon footprints, whether 
for purely financial or for more altruistic reasons, but that the 
traditional carbon industry is still able to counteract much of 
the carbon reductions achieved by other companies through the 
sheer size of the industry’s planned carbon output as described 
above.198 The carbon industry is virtually out of government 
control at the global level. This situation is untenable and must 
be turned around if we as a world society are truly serious 
about finding solutions to climate change.199 It is beyond the 
scope of this article and almost impossible to answer the 
question of just how to do so. However, it is still encouraging 
that initiatives such as Climate Savers are able to work 
                                                          
 197. For example, in 2012, BP ran commercials on national televised news 
stations still boasting the company’s alleged interest in the environment years 
after having caused one of the worst oil drilling disasters in history. See Cain 
Burdeau, BP Ad Campaign Following Gulf Oil Spill Deemed ‘Propaganda’ by 
Some, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2012, 11:38 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2012/01/08/bp-ad-campaign-gulf-oil-_n_1192600.html. 
 198. See supra Part II.B. 
 199. See supra Part II.A. 
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productively with other corporations if not the carbon industry 
for obvious reasons. In short, action on many fronts is required. 
It is fair to conclude that Climate Savers sets a promising 
precedent for companies willing to undertake voluntary, but 
quasi-binding action. 
C. VOLUNTARY EXPERIMENTS 
The U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection 
Agreement (MCPA) and the International Council for Local 
Environmental Initiatives’s (ICLEI) GreenClimateCities 
initative create contrast to programs with a more binding 
nature such as the EU Covenant of Mayors. These two 
voluntary programs are, in particular, relevant in this context 
as both they and the Covenant are city coalition programs. But 
whereas the Covenant appears to be both procedurally and 
substantively successful,200 more action needs to be 
demonstrated by the MCPA and GreenClimateCities before 
these can reasonably be determined to be effective in both 
aspects as well. 
1. MCPA 
The MCPA has been ratified by 1,054 mayors from cities in 
all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, 
representing a total population of almost 90 million people.201 
The program was launched by then Seattle Mayor Greg Nichols 
in 2005 on the date on which the Kyoto Protocol took legal 
effect for the ratifying nations.202 
Under the MCPA, participating cities have committed to 
take the following three actions: 
- Strive to meet or beat the [2012] Kyoto Protocol targets in their own 
communities, through actions ranging from anti-sprawl land-use  
 
                                                          
 200. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 201. List of Participating Mayors, MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION CENTER, 
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/list.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
However, a map of participating cities show significant clustering around 
traditionally progressive urban areas such as San Francisco, Seattle, Portland, 
and other large metropolitan areas. Cities That Have Signed On, MAYORS 
CLIMATE PROTECTION CENTER, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/ 
ClimateChange.asp (last updated Feb. 12, 2013). 
 202. U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, MAYORS 
CLIMATE PROTECTION CENTER, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/ 
agreement.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2012). 
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policies to urban forest restoration projects to public information 
campaigns; 
- Urge their state governments, and the federal government, to enact 
policies and programs to meet or beat the greenhouse gas emission 
reduction target suggested for the United States in the Kyoto Protocol 
--[a] 7% reduction from 1990 levels by 2012; and 
- Urge the U.S. Congress to pass the [sic] bipartisan greenhouse gas 
reduction legislation, which would establish a national emission 
trading system203 
Although the initiative thus refers to “commitments,” it 
features no enforcement mechanisms and thus no ramifications 
for noncompliance.204 The program is entirely voluntary.205 
To sign up for the MCPA, mayors have to sign a simple 
one-page “agreement” simply stating, “You have my support for 
the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement” with the possibility 
for adding comments that will be posted on the website.206 
Although simplicity in drafting agreements can be good, too 
much simplicity can also be seen as a lack of a genuine interest 
in reaching the ultimate goal, namely GHG emissions 
reductions that can prevent dangerous climate change. 
Further, because the 7% target to be reached is substantively 
highly limited, especially as knowledge has cemented in recent 
years that reductions need to be tenfold that of the initial 
MCPA “commitment,” the MCPA’s outcome-relevance has 
dwindled in spite of at least some early promise for potential.207 
This is arguably aggravated by the fact that the agreement 
features no enforcement or apparent accountability.208 Today, 
the MCPA thus appears to have become more of a political 
public relations tool than an agreement with much real 
“bite.”209 
                                                          
 203. Id. (emphasis added). 
 204. Telephone Interview with Kevin McCarty, Managing Dir., MCPA 
(Aug. 7, 2012). 
 205. Id. 
 206. The U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement—
Signature Page, USMAYORS.ORG, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/ 
documents/signaturepage.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2013). 
 207. See supra Part II.A. 
 208. Cf. U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, supra 
note 202. 
 209. Compare supra text accompanying note 203 (explaining the goals of 
the MCPA), with supra Part II.A (noting necessary emissions reductions).  It 
should be kept in mind that emissions reductions of approximately 5% was the 
goal discussed under the UNFCCC regime at the time the MCPA was adopted. 
See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, art. 3, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162. However, it soon became 
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Although the participating mayors have “recognize[d] the 
need for a federal partner in this effort [and] they cannot and 
will not wait to act until Washington is ready to move on this 
problem,” the MCPA website does not provide any updates as 
to any substantively significant results or even any recent 
general updates.210 Although it is difficult to prove a negative, 
one is inclined to assume that if the organization’s members 
had been able to meet or exceed their targets, such results 
would have been announced through the program, especially 
given the initial interest by the members in the potential for 
public relations benefits via the MCPA. 
2. ICLEI and the GreenClimateCities Initiative 
ICLEI—Local Governments for Sustainability—counts 
among its members “12 mega-cities, 100 super-cities and urban 
regions, 450 large cities as well as 450  medium-sized cities and 
towns in 84 countries.”211 ICLEI was the first global network of 
cities and local governments established to achieve 
sustainability at the local level.212 ICLEI’s 1991 “Urban CO2 
Reduction Project[] implemented in 14 cities across the U[nited] 
S[tates], Europe and Canada, was [among] the first concrete 
measure[s] in local climate action.”213 Under ICLEI’s initial 
Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) campaign, participating 
cities were expected to follow a “five milestone” process 
following a political commitment by their local governments.214 
Milestone One requires the cities to “[c]onduct a baseline 
emissions inventory and forecast.”215 Milestone Two calls for 
the “[a]dopt[ion of] an emissions reduction target for the 
forecast year.”216 Milestone Three specifies the requirements 
                                                          
clear that much higher emissions reductions goals were needed. See supra 
Part II.A. The MCPA has not changed its targets in line with this. 
 210. About the Mayors Climate Protection Center, MAYORS CLIMATE 
PROTECTION CENTER, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/about.htm 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
 211. Who We Are, ICLEI GLOBAL, http://www.iclei.org/iclei-global/who-is-
iclei.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 212. ICLEI Climate Program, ICLEI GLOBAL, http://archive.iclei.org/ 
?id=940940 (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 213. Id. 
 214. The Five Milestone Process, ICLEI GLOBAL, http://www.iclei.org/ 
index.php?id=810 (last visited Jan. 27, 2013). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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for the development of a local action plan: 
Through a multi-stakeholder process, the city develops a Local Action 
Plan that describes the policies and measures that the local 
government will take to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and achieve 
its emissions reduction target. . . . In addition to direct greenhouse 
gas reduction measures, most plans also incorporate public awareness 
and education efforts.217 
Milestone Four addresses the “[i]mplement[ation of] policies 
and measures.”218 Milestone Five requires the cities to monitor 
and verify their respective progress on the implementation of 
measures.219 
GreenClimateCities is ICLEI’s newest EU-funded platform 
for low-carbon city development which is meant to phase out 
the CCP campaign.220 The program launched in June 2012 and 
is being rolled out through pilot implementation in India, South 
Africa, Indonesia, and Brazil.221 The program assists cities in 
achieving low-carbon development and management through, 
among other methods, technical support, networking, carbon 
target-setting, emissions accounting and control, and the 
quantification of reduction measures:222 
Cities will receive guidance and technical support from ICLEI as they 
set up their greenhouse gas emissions inventory; identify 
opportunities for rapid emission reductions; develop a climate action 
plan; identify finance for urban infrastructure projects; and measure 
progress and report their achievements to the global carbonn Cities 
Climate Registry. This 3-step approach of analyzation, action and 
acceleration ensures continuation of best practices and tailors them to 
the specific urban area.223 
                                                          
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See Low-Carbon, Climate-Resilient Cities, ICLEI GLOBAL, 
http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=800 (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (noting that 
local climate initiatives are only one part of a larger concept of low emission 
urban development). 
 221. Email from Yunus Arikan, Manager, ICLEI, to to Myanna Dellinger, 
Assistant Professor of Law, W. State Coll. of Law (Nov. 21, 2012) (on file with 
author). 
 222. See id.; GREENCLIMATECITIES, ICLEI 1–3 (2012), available at 
http://www.iclei.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/Global/About_ICLEI/br
ochures/GCC_final_Brochure.pdf (highlighting the HEAT+ accounting and 
reporting tool); Low-Carbon, Climate-Resilient Cities, supra note 220 
(explaining the technical support and networking components). 
 223. GreenClimateCities: Local Governments Respond to Green Cross Task 
Force’s Appeal for Urgent Action on Climate Change, ICLEI (June 18, 2012), 
http://archive.iclei.org/index.php?id=1487&tx_ttnews[pS]=1357901598&tx_ttn
ews[pointer]=9&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4873&tx_ttnews[backPid]=1556&cHash=
19a23eca88 [hereinafter Local Governments Respond]. 
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Members of the GreenClimateCities set specific and 
individual carbon reduction goals.224 These members’ 
individual goals are measured using Heat+, ICLEI’s globally 
accessible online accounting and reporting tool sponsored by, 
among others, the EU.225 Results are registered with the 
carbonn Cities Climate Registry (cCCR), which is overseen by 
the neutral third party Bonn Center for Local Climate Action 
and Reporting.226 As of November 2012, 232 cities from 25 
countries, purported to represent a population of 235 million 
inhabitants and control community GHG emissions of 1.5 
GtCO2 each year, reported 561 climate and energy 
commitments, 557 GHG inventories, and a total of 2092 
mitigation and adaptation actions and action plans through the 
cCCR.227 
Importantly, global partnering with other climate change 
projects such as the WWF Earth Hour City Challenge, the 
Japan Registry Project, and The Mexico City Pact forms a 
significant part of ICLEI’s efforts, just as the initiative operates 
with an interface to major supranational governmental 
organizations.228 For example, Heat+ complies with the IPCC 
guidelines just as ICLEI partners with the United Nations 
Environmental Programme.229 
Although ICLEI, and thus GreenClimateCities, asks the 
members to commit to certain targets, it does not apply any 
enforcement method, at least not in a traditional sense of the 
word.230 Instead, the members are expected to self-police their 
                                                          
 224. See, e.g., GREENCLIMATECITIES, supra note 222, at 1, 3 (noting the 
entry point may be different for “starters and advanced cities”); Low-Carbon, 
Climate-Resilient Cities, supra note 220 (stating the availability of local tools 
for setting local goals). 
 225. See Low-Carbon, Climate-Resilient Cities, supra note 220 
(highlighting the availability of the HEAT+ system); Sponsors, HEAT+, 
http://heat.iclei.org/heatplusv4n/sponsors.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) 
(listing the organizations that support HEAT+). 
 226. GREENCLIMATECITIES, supra note 222, at 4. 
 227. CARBONN CITIES CLIMATE REGISTRY, RAISING THE GLOBAL LEVEL OF 
AMBITION THROUGH LOCAL CLIMATE ACTION 1 (2012), available at 
http://citiesclimateregistry.org/fileadmin/user_upload/cCCR/cCCR_November2
012_Update/cCCR_November2012.pdf. 
 228. Id. at 6. 
 229. See GREENCLIMATECITIES, supra note 222, at 3; Our Partners, ICLEI, 
http://www.iclei.org/cn/iclei-global/our-partners.html (last visited Mar. 24, 
2013). 
 230. See Local Governments Respond, supra note 223 (“[I]nvites cities 
worldwide . . .  to take voluntary climate action now . . . .”). 
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efforts and make the outcomes publicly available via the 
cCCR.231 Thus, members are faced with only the “threat” of 
potential public scorn if they do not live up to the adopted 
targets; as an enforcement mechanism, GreenClimateCities 
finds itself on the voluntary end of the compliance continuum 
spectrum.232 The organization recognizes this fact: “The 
GreenClimateCities initiative invites cities worldwide to join 
efforts by local governments from all parts of the world to take 
voluntary climate action now and not wait for national 
governments to eventually come to a global climate 
agreement.”233 
Whether this model proves to be more or less effective than 
city initiatives with a more traditional “adversarial” 
enforcement style, such as that employed by the Covenant, 
remains to be seen. This program is too new to demonstrate 
any substantive success.234 However, this and similar programs 
do demonstrate the potential for, and continued interest in, 
voluntary city action leading to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation results.235 What appears promising from such 
schemes is the ability for cities around the world to bypass 
potential state and national government inaction while 
maintaining an interface to, and potentially cooperating with, 
supranational organizations.236 These relatively new actors 
actually act, whereas traditional actors continue the stalemate 
situation with which the world community has grown 
increasingly dissatisfied.237 It is precisely because some of these 
scaled-down initiatives are so new, yet showing progress, that 
there is reason for cautious optimism that dawn is coming to 
climate change efforts that go beyond mere rhetoric.238 Local 
entities are adopting emissions targets with, broadly 
interpreted, some accountability and repercussions for non-
                                                          
 231. See id. 
 232. Id. (mentioning ICLEI’s nineteen-year experience overseeing the 
voluntary participation in its various programs). 
 233. Id. (emphasis added). 
 234. The program started in June 2012 and it takes time for emissions to 
be reduced and reported. See supra notes 216, 221 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 237. See Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20–22) (highlighting the 
difficulty inherent in different nations agreeing to climate change initiatives 
because of competing interests). 
 238. See supra Part III.A.1–2 (discussing the success of the Covenant and 
CRAG programs, respectively). 
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compliance through a variety of voluntary and mandatory 
enforcement efforts. At the more voluntary end of the spectrum 
there are threats of negative publicity and calls for self-
correction.239 At the more mandatory end there are fines, 
program expulsions, and other more traditional enforcement 
mechanisms.240 
D. INTERIM LESSONS LEARNED FROM CITY COALITION PROGRAMS 
By contrasting the above city coalition initiatives, the 
following lessons about the potential efficacy of such programs 
emerge: seen from a more or less isolated point of view, city 
programs with at least some degree of enforcement appear to be 
more effective than initiatives without any enforcement.241 The 
type of sanction under the EU program—exclusion from group 
membership—is arguably not terribly severe at first blush, but 
may nonetheless drive members to attempt to meet their 
adopted goals for “naming and shaming” and other reasons.242 
Public disclosure of progress by each participating entity under 
the Climate Savers program and the ICLEI-based models, for 
example, has the same effects and thus demonstrates what the 
program leaders themselves have determined will help drive 
cities to join the initiatives and take action.243 Listening to the 
actors themselves is also important to external discourse 
regarding potential program efficacies.244 For example, all 
programs operate with a significant degree of generalized peer 
pressure and the desire to stand out as progressive leaders in 
                                                          
 239. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 176–78 (using reporting in 
front of peers as its enforcement mechanism). 
 240. See supra text accompanying notes 96–97, 123–29 (identifying 
termination from the EU Covenant of Mayors program and fines in the CRAG 
programs as the enforcement mechanisms, respectively). 
 241. The MCPA program employs no enforcement mechanism and has 
shown little success compared to the EU Covenant of Mayors program, CRAG 
programs, and the Climate Savers program. Compare supra text 
accompanying note 205, with supra text accompanying notes 101, 138–40, 
187–96 (sharing the success of the EU Covenant of Mayors program, CRAG 
programs, and the Climate Savers program, respectively). 
 242. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 243. See supra notes 176–78, 230–33 and accompanying text (Climate 
Savers and ICLEI, respectively). 
 244. In some of the programs, sharing experiences and knowledge is a key 
component in the program. See, e.g., Low-Carbon, Climate-Resilient Cities, 
supra note 220 (explaining the networking components). 
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the climate change arena.245 They are based on both financial 
stressors and motivators such as financing assistance, difficult 
economic times requiring cross-sector energy savings, and the 
realization of the danger of relying on imported oil from 
politically unstable regions.246 Program signatories also wish to 
benefit from the channeling of funds from competing areas to 
their local areas.247 Sharing technical and non-technical 
knowledge among program members and national governance 
bodies is also important, just as general networking advantages 
are typically listed among the benefits of joining the 
programs.248 
Another lesson pertains to the stronger bargaining position 
of large (as compared to smaller) governmental units. Thus, 
actors in the EU city scheme have recognized the benefit of 
having the EU negotiate with third-party financial actors to set 
up financial facilities aimed at aiding accomplishment of the 
tasks of the action plans.249 Thus, vertical governance 
cooperation is important in relation to the success of action 
initiated by cities and other types of bottom-up action.250 Also 
important is the involvement of civil society.251 The MCPA, 
however, makes no references to any kind of public 
participation: “Aside from a provision providing for helping 
with climate change education, no reference is made to the 
importance and role of an ample public consultation process.”252 
                                                          
 245. For example, Mr. McCarty of the MCPA says that after the Seattle 
mayor took the initiative for the program, the duty became viral in the United 
States, even at an early point in time. Telephone Interview with Kevin 
McCarty, supra note 204. According to Mr. McCarty, mayors are aware of the 
fact that they are often expected to act on socio-cultural changes without 
initial impetus or support by larger government bodies. Id. 
 246. Id.; As a Local Authority, supra note 90. 
 247. Telephone Interview with Kevin McCarty, supra note 204; As a Local 
Authority, supra note 90. 
 248. See, e.g., Low-Carbon, Climate-Resilient Cities, supra note 220 
(explaining the technical support and networking components of the program). 
 249. See TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 90, at 6 
(highlighting the European Local Energy Assistance facility and the European 
Energy Efficiency Fund). 
 250. Id. at 4 (stating that the covenant coordinators play an important role 
in communicating between the local authorities and the larger national and 
supranational entities). 
 251. For the advantages of civil society involvement in bottom-up 
lawmaking, see Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 21–28). 
 252. Rmulo Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, Regulating Climate Change Risk 
at the Local Level—the Denver Experience: Greenprint or Greenwash?, 17 MO. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 356, 370 (2010). 
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Opening up the policy-making process to public participation, 
including discussing how to proceed on certain issues and how 
the available financial and other resources should be used, 
increases the legitimacy of the regulating process and shares 
responsibilities of the final outcomes.253 Then the regulated can 
become the regulators; a recognized advantage in modern law 
and policymaking and enforcement.254 The EU model’s focus on 
mobilizing civil society to take part in developing the Action 
Plan is, thus, a better solution and should be emulated in 
similar future programs. 
It is clear that the time has come for cities and other local 
governance units to step up their action and roles within 
climate change mitigation and adaptation in more diverse ways 
than before. Cities enjoy unique positions as advisors, 
motivators, and role models.255 They can lead by example by 
reducing their own energy consumption in public buildings as 
well as by procuring their energy from sustainable sources.256 
They can lead more awareness-raising activities.257 As 
planners, regulators, and developers, they can take relevant 
legislative and other legal action.258 As energy producers and 
suppliers, they can promote and produce more renewable 
energy.259 In the American context, had a national climate 
change framework been adopted in the United States, it would 
have, to a large extent, needed to be implemented at the city 
level.260 Cities and other local government units must be even 
more proactive and not wait for national governments to lead 
the way with climate change initiatives. As the above shows, 
effective action can, and should be instigated at the local level 
at this point in time. All such solutions will require accurate 
                                                          
 253. Id. 
 254. See Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 25). 
 255. For an analysis of the several roles played by cities as well as their 
importance to top-down or bottom-up governance, see Dellinger, supra note 1 
(manuscript at 21–28). See also TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 
90, at 4 (“[T]he local administration is the closest government level to engage 
citizens and reconcile public and private interests.”). 
 256. See Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 56–77). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Cf. TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 90, at 4 (noting that 
successful cooperative solutions are being achieved at the local and regional 
levels even when the national and international levels are struggling to 
implement a successful program). 
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and reliable emissions accounting and reporting. This aspect 
will be examined next. 
E. REPORTING WITH MANDATORY IMPLICATIONS 
To be considered reliable among climate regulation 
skeptics and advocates alike, it is particularly important for 
programs to ensure neutral and reliable reporting, accounting, 
and compliance oversight.261 Consumer demand for 
transparency with respect to environmental performance is 
increasing, which further adds to the need for trustworthy 
reporting programs.262 With the establishment of more and 
more climate-focused initiatives around the world, it is also 
necessary to apply relatively homogenous and transparent 
emissions reporting standards such that it is possible to be able 
to compare “apples to apples” at the international level.263 This 
section will analyze the Climate Registry as an example of how 
to accomplish these goals and the relevant concerns in future 
developments of this and other reporting platforms. 
A self-proclaimed “bottom-up” approach to emissions 
accounting, the Climate Registry is a non-profit collaboration 
established and governed by North American states, provinces, 
territories, and Native Sovereign Nations.264 It is the only 
program of its kind in North America that started and operates 
as a voluntary initiative.265 The program sets standards for 
members to calculate, verify, and publicly report their GHG 
emissions into one single registry.266 The results are verified by 
independent bodies accredited by the American National 
Standards Institute.267 The Climate Registry now supports 
voluntary, regulatory, and mandatory reporting programs and 
                                                          
 261. See HOFFMAN, supra note 82, at 89 (belonging to the Climate Register 
can legitimize reduction claims). 
 262. Cf. id. at 89, 91 (standardizing reporting measurements allows the 
public to assess the progress and compare various entities). 
 263. See id. (using uniform measurements allows all members, whether 
they are regulated or non-regulated, to assess their progress equally). 
 264. FAQs, CLIMATE REGISTRY, http://www.theclimateregistry.org/about/ 
faqs/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2013). 
 265. Denise Sheehan & Alex Carr, The Future of GHG Reporting: 
Patchwork or Tapestry?, EM, Oct. 2010, at 12, 12–14. 
 266. Mission, CLIMATE REGISTRY, http://www.theclimateregistry.org/about/ 
mission/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 267. See FAQs, supra note 264 (acknowledging that the verifiers have 
experience in other areas of verification as well); List of Verification Bodies,  
CLIMATE REGISTRY, http://www.theclimateregistry.org/resources/verification/ 
list-of-verification-bodies/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2013). 
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thus has both indirect, but also direct, legal implications.268 
The membership consists of corporations, government 
agencies (now at the city, state, and federal levels), as well as 
nonprofit organizations.269 The Registry has approximately 430 
current members including energy-producing and energy-
source companies, car manufacturers, mining companies, 
environmentally-oriented NGOs, colleges, and government 
bodies.270 The Registry partners with several GHG reductions 
programs such as ICLEI and the U.S. Conference of Mayors’ 
Climate Initiative.271 Membership is also required for members 
of the Western Climate Initiative.272 The EPA has, since 2009, 
required reporting by “large” GHG emitters in the United 
States.273 This reporting, however, must be done directly to the 
EPA and thus not, for example, to the Climate Registry.274 This 
may add to the “patchwork problem” whereby too many actors 
on the climate change scene may add unnecessary complexity 
and overlapping requirements.275 Because of the sheer extent of 
EPA’s reporting requirement,276 it may be feared that this 
would drive programs, such as the Climate Registry, into a 
                                                          
 268. See FAQs, supra note 264 (explaining that while the Registry itself 
will not establish any regulations, it supports the reporting of any type of 
emissions data, including those that may also be recorded in order to comply 
with a law). 
 269. List of Members, CLIMATE REGISTRY, http://www.theclimateregistry 
.org/members/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2013). 
 270. Id. 
 271. See FAQs, supra note 264 (expressing that the Registry is meant to be 
complementary to these other programs). 
 272. HOFFMAN, supra note 82, at 89 (explaining that the reporting system 
used by the Climate Registry provided federal regulators with a working 
model). 
 273. Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat 1844 
(2007). According to the EPA, the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program “will 
help us better understand where greenhouse gas emissions are coming from 
and will improve our ability to make informed policy, business, and regulatory 
decisions.” Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
ghgreporting/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
 274. Cf. Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, supra note 273 (indicating 
that all GHG data must be reported using the EPA’s GHG Reporting 
Program). 
 275. See Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 22) (stating that bottom-up 
lawmaking can be “unchoreographed”); Sheehan & Carr, supra note 265, at 
12. 
 276. The “EPA estimates [that the reporting rule] will cover approximately 
85% of U.S. GHG emissions and apply to 10,000 facilities.” Sheehan & Carr, 
supra note 265, at 12. 
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state of  decreased relevance. In turn, this could be a problem 
to those emitters who are not required to report to the EPA, 
such as smaller emitters and non-American sources. 
Additionally, twenty-six states have developed, or are 
developing, mandatory GHG reporting rules, many of which go 
beyond the EPA requirements.277 The Registry might have a 
role to play in supporting reporting under such programs. The 
EPA also recognizes the importance of voluntary programs, so 
program co-existence and cooperation might also become a 
positive result.278 
In addition to the usual benefits of membership, such as 
technical assistance, networking, and promotional advantages, 
membership of the Climate Registry enables participants to set 
a baseline for GHG emissions for use in current and possible 
future regulatory programs.279 This also positions the members 
to be ready for large-scale emission trading under cap and 
trade programs, should these become the norm or requirement 
at a future stage.280 Further, because the Registry interfaces 
with several government bodies, it already enjoys quite a bit of 
legitimacy in the climate regulation context, which is also a 
solid starting point if emissions trading becomes the order of 
the day.281 Simply put, the Climate Registry is “building the 
infrastructure for a carbon market,” but also for North 
American registration efforts more broadly.282 Finally, the 
interaction among government-mandated regulatory solutions 
and purely voluntary, bottom-up solutions is significant in 
times of still limited government mandates, because it 
demonstrates how bottom-up solutions have the potential for 
fossilizing into government mandates at scaled-up levels and, 
thus, eventually, “hard law.”283 In short, the Climate Registry 
is an example of how programs that commence as voluntary 
                                                          
 277. Id. at 13. 
 278. Id. at 13–14. 
 279. Benefits of Participation, CLIMATE REGISTRY, http://www.climate 
registry.org/about/benefits-of-participation.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
 280. HOFFMAN, supra note 82, at 89. 
 281. Id. at 89–90. 
 282. Id. at 87. 
 283. The North American Energy Reliability Council has demonstrated 
this potential in the field of energy reliability. See History, N. AM. ENERGY 
RELIABILITY COUNCIL, http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=1|7|11 (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013) (discussing the evolution of NERC from a voluntary, informal 
organization within the energy industry to a central player in the 
establishment and enforcement of mandatory energy reliability standards). 
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programs may, over time and indirectly, obtain mandatory 
importance. 
An analysis of the different roles played by the Climate 
Registry sheds further light on the broader effects and benefits 
of this and similar programs. First, the Registry plays an 
important functional role in standardizing GHG emissions 
reporting, both for those members that are likely to be 
regulated by national or regional policies and those that are 
not.284 Thus, it serves a “smoothing function” by laying out 
procedures and protocols for measuring carbon emissions in 
uniform ways.285 Through the Registry, climate change leaders 
can legitimately claim to be so.286 In fact, the most important 
reason for implementing actors to join the Registry is to be 
recognized for climate leadership.287 This stands in contrast to, 
for example, the Climate Savers program under which some 
corporations have expressed reservations regarding promoting 
their environmentally friendly actions externally after recent 
“greenwashing” debacles.288 The Registry is creating a platform 
for transparency, accountability, and uniformity in a still 
somewhat controversial branch of science and law. 
Additionally, the Registry helps build a significant 
domestic political carbon registration infrastructure.289 For 
example, the Climate Registry influenced the EPA as it 
developed its mandatory GHG reporting rule, issued in 2009.290 
Corporations, government entities, and others urged the EPA 
to adopt Climate Registry procedures, including the third-party 
verification process, which stands at the core of the Registry’s 
inventory protocols.291 The Registry is thus a “powerful 
platform for subnational governments to engage with the 
federal governments in the United States and Canada as they 
(potentially) develop national responses to climate change.”292 
The Registry is a promising development with the potential for 
increased future importance should emissions reporting become 
                                                          
 284. HOFFMAN, supra note 82, at 89. 
 285. Id. at 91. 
 286. Id. at 89. 
 287. Id. 
 288. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text. 
 289. HOFFMAN, supra note 82, at 89–91. 
 290. Id. at 90. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 89–90. 
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more broadly mandatory. It is an innovative program that is 
developing at the seams of voluntary and regulated activity and 
presents a “key example of how experiments work together 
across governance models . . . .”293 The program is therefore  
also an example of vertical cooperation. It also demonstrates 
the potential for horizontal interfacing with a variety of climate 
change-related programs at similar levels, whether or not these 
are, strictly seen, “mandatory,” “regulatory,” or purely 
“voluntary.” 
Further, the program has international potential as its 
governance and general members include both American and 
Canadian entities.294 The Registry has participated in 
discussions about globalizing the model and may thereby gain 
international reach outside the United States and Canada.295 
For instance, the Registry is currently working with a Chinese 
NGO and an environmental department of the government of 
Israel to help develop registries in those countries.296 The 
Registry is also participating in discussions about launching 
similar registries in other areas.297 Thus, infrastructure 
building through the Registry may be going global.298 This is 
noteworthy because of the potential advantage of having fewer 
global actors claiming to provide the “best” emissions 
accounting and reporting oversight (and the “best” programs in 
general). Homogeneity at a larger, international scale may not 
only prove more intrinsically sound to the climate change 
mitigation efforts and programs themselves, but also might 
establish more external credibility to actors (both corporate and 
governmental) who have not yet committed to any or much 
action. These considerations, as well as the potential for 
governments to interact effectively with non-government units 
in climate reporting and overall programs, should be taken into 
account in both the design and implementation of future 
climate change reduction initiatives. 
 
                                                          
 293. Id. at 91. 
 294. Id. at 90. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
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IV. WHAT DOES “SUCCESS” MEAN WITHIN THE  
CLIMATE CHANGE DISCOURSE? 
Before attempting to evaluate the actual or the potential 
for success of the above programs, it is necessary to consider 
which benchmarks to apply in doing so. Substantive carbon 
reduction improvements are of obvious importance, but other 
outcome variables are also important to a possible 
determination of success. 
A. BENCHMARKS FOR SUCCESS 
Public participation in the design, implementation, and 
enforcement of laws and policies is a widely recognized 
indicator of success not just within climate change, but to law 
in general.299 However, one school of thought in the climate 
change context is that “[b]ecause of the underlying uncertainty 
on [sic] the causation between the best local climate change 
mitigation policy and the real and concrete impact on a global 
environmental problem, . . . efficiency can only be measured 
procedurally.”300 It “cannot be measured taking into account 
the quality of the final regulatory result.”301 Whereas there can 
be no doubt about the many and important benefits of public 
participation, and it is, to be sure, difficult to trace with exact 
certainty any possible positive carbon reduction results to just 
one or a few causes, such difficulty does not warrant the claim 
that public participation should be the only benchmark for 
success within climate change or any other area of the law.302 
Causation uncertainties, as well as other legal and technical 
difficulties, abound in relation to many other complex areas of 
the law.303 Fortunately, that has not stopped, and should not 
stop, the discourse about how to measure success more broadly 
than by merely verifying the degree to which public 
                                                          
 299. See generally Karen Syma Czapanskiy & Rashida Manjoo, The Right 
of Public Participation in the Law-Making Process and the Role of Legislature 
in the Promotion of This Right, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 4 (2008) 
(“[L]egislation is better when legislators are required to invite and attend to 
public input, and . . . citizenship is better when legislators are required to 
invite and attend to public input.”). 
 300. Sampaio, supra note 252, at 357 (emphasis added). 
 301. Id. at 372 (emphasis added). 
 302. See generally Margaret A. Berger & Lawrence M. Solan, The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Science and Law: An Essay and Introduction, 73 BROOK. 
L. REV. 847 (2008). 
 303. Id. 
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participation is applied in various initiatives. Courses of action, 
legislative progress, and on-the-ground results can be 
evaluated retroactively in an attempt to identify general 
patterns that appear to indicate greater substantive efficiencies 
than others. Because law and policy are not an exact science, 
attempting to achieve “exact certainty” in relation to what may 
work and what may not is too limiting and does not help in 
moving the agenda forward. This article thus also measures 
indicia of possible substantive efficacy in addition to public 
participation. 
The best measure of success of environmental initiatives is, 
in fact, widely considered to be the substantive improvement of 
environmental conditions, sustainability, and improved energy 
infrastructures.304 As regards to climate change in particular, 
success measured in terms of actual effects would thus 
encompass, among other things, reduced carbon emissions, 
reduced energy consumption in general, and reduced total costs 
of reducing CO2 levels.305 As there is still uncertainty as to how 
to achieve these goals, flexibility in program designs is also a 
key benchmark of success within climate change efforts.306 As 
precious time goes by without climate change being addressed 
sufficiently, it also becomes more and more necessary for 
effective programs to include adaptation measures in addition 
to prevention.307 Adaptation efforts must include components 
that protect both natural resources and natural services as well 
as humankind from the coming crises.308 Adaptation and 
prevention are considered to form part of a “basic litmus test” 
for regional systems, but of course also apply to national and 
                                                          
 304. See, e.g., Laura C. Bickel, Baby Teeth: An Argument in Defense of the 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 815, 849 
(2003); Carrie Dolmat-Connell, After Nafta: Can A New International 
Convention On Toxic Trade Be Far Behind?, 12 B.U. INT’L L.J. 443, 458–59 
(1994); J. B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive 
System: How to Clean Up the Environment By Making a Mess of 
Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 988 n. 210 (1997); Andrew Schatz, 
Discounting the Clean Development Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
703, 722 (2008); Susan A. Schneider, Reconsidering the Industrialization of 
Agriculture, 26 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 19, 27 (2011). 
 305. Cf. Kevin Begos, U.S. Carbon Emissions: 2012 Levels at 20 Year Low, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2012, 10:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/08/16/us-carbon-dioxide-emissions-2012_n_1792167.html. 
 306. James Olmsted, The Global Warming Crisis: An Analytical 
Framework to Regional Responses, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 125, 159 (2008). 
 307. Id. at 165–67. 
 308. Id. 
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supranational efforts.309 
Another layer of analysis can be applied to the above 
considerations regarding success within climate change efforts, 
namely what has been termed the “Who, When, and How 
Test.”310 The “Who” part of the test examines the type of action 
bodies that are created in connection with new legislation or 
other relevant action, and who is appointed to such bodies.311 
Responsible task forces with leaders willing and able to move 
the agenda forward must be established.312 Accordingly, such 
parties must be willing to fully implement potential new laws 
to avoid a de facto failure of the “Who” test.313 They should not, 
however, have unfettered discretion in how to reach the 
objectives with which they have been tasked. For example: 
[A]n agency often becomes more powerful and has more control over 
particular outcomes than the legislature, particularly in light of the 
broad discretion courts usually give agencies. In this case, resources, 
authority, and discretion can easily become global warming negatives. 
Political leaders may come and go, but agency personnel will most 
often retain their positions through multiple administrations. Once 
entrenched in their jobs, such agency personnel may develop great 
power, but then use that power to maintain their own positions rather 
than bravely striking out to implement the true intent of the law. As 
can be readily imagined, the Who test may be the most important 
factor in any analysis of how a bill will work.314 
The “When” test looks at whether timeframes for action are 
sufficiently short: “Because time is of the essence in every last 
effort to mitigate global warming, [a] lack of specificity 
regarding timing may represent a failure of the When test.”315 
The “How” test requires specificity in relation to how to reach 
the program goals.316 
Finally, the “success” of any environmental program will 
have to include a significant mobilization of broad segments of 
private forces including corporations. Whereas governments 
and the public-interest sector have important roles to play, 
solutions that do not seek to involve even broader segments of 
civil society and the business sector run the risk of becoming 
                                                          
 309. Id. at 156–57. 
 310. Id. at 157. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 157–58. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 158. 
 315. Id. at 157–58. 
 316. Id. at 158. 
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lopsided at best and ineffective at worst. In former UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s words: “Action starts with 
Governments. . . . But Governments cannot do [this] alone. 
Civil society groups have a critical role, as partners, advocates 
and watchdogs. So do commercial enterprises. Without the 
private sector, sustainable development will remain only a 
distant dream.”317 Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of 
the UNFCCC, agrees, “We need the corporate sector to play a 
part [in the fight against climate change] and to contribute.”318 
B. CAN LOCAL ACTION BE “TOO SUCCESSFUL”? 
Localized climate change action does not only create viable 
steps towards climate change mitigation and adaptation; there 
is also a flip side of the coin. The proliferation of local 
initiatives has demonstrated pitfalls that should be borne in 
mind and, if possible, avoided in future processes. Some of 
these negative concerns include the following. 
First, “[t]here is a tendency to measure success in the field 
of environmental law more in terms of legal acts than in terms 
of actually improving the environment.”319 However, the true 
measure of success in this field is, of course, whether actual 
results are achieved. In fact, more and more acts, regulations, 
and programs may well lead to an inopportune fragmentation 
of otherwise potentially promising initiatives into disjointed, 
inhomogeneous action, and thus be counterproductive to the 
ultimate goal. More concerted action would be better. There is 
no need to reinvent the wheel again and again, as currently 
seems to be the direction in which many actors are going.320 
This will not help the agenda out of the stalemate in which it 
has found itself in recent years. It thus seems that instead of 
                                                          
 317. Attila Tanzi, Controversial Developments in the Field of Public 
Participation in the International Environmental Law Process, in NGOS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFICIENCY IN FLEXIBILITY? 136 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy & 
Luisa Vierucci eds., 2008). 
 318. Doha Conference Leaders Hail UN Climate Change Agreement, SAUDI 
GAZETTE  (Dec. 11, 2012, 12:34 AM), http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/ 
index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20121211145601. 
 319. Dolmat-Connell, supra note 304, at 458 (quoting Mostafa Tolba, 
Report of the Meeting of Senior Government Officials Expert in Environmental 
law for the Review of Montevideo Programme, Oct. 30–Nov. 2, 1991, U.N. Doc. 
UNEP/Env.Law/2/3 (Nov. 22, 1991), reprinted in TRANSBOUNDARY 
MOVEMENTS AND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
BASIC DOCUMENTS 186 (Barbara Kwiatkowska & Alfred H.A. Soons eds., 
1993)) (internal brackets omitted). 
 320. See supra notes 85–298 and accompanying text. 
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focusing on efficiency and substance, some of these actors are 
using climate change just as much or more for promotional 
reasons than for the goal of reaching the actual goals necessary 
to prevent extreme climate change.321 Less fragmentation and 
more cooperation would be ideal. 
Further, when action becomes too widespread, the 
potential for cost savings due to economies of scale becomes 
diminished.322 From an important technical point of view, some 
pollutants may also escape limiting action altogether through 
schemes that are too fragmented: “[B]ecause the sources of 
GHGs are globally widespread, even ubiquitous, in every 
country and every sector of the economy, subglobal regulatory 
coverage fails to control important sources of pollutants.”323 
Similarly, an important cross-border “leakage” problem 
may become the result of action that is “too” localized.324 
“Leakage” denotes situations where subglobal and/or 
subnational regulations encourage emissions “activities to shift 
or ‘leak’ to unregulated areas over time.”325 It can be traced to 
three causes: “a price effect, a ‘slack off’ effect, and a capital 
relocation effect.”326 The price effect relates to situations in 
which GHG regulations in one geographical area may affect the 
prices of and thus demand for certain products in that country 
with a spill-over effect in another.327 Consider, for example, 
that “restricting forest clearing in Country A would restrict 
timber supply and raise the world market price for timber, 
inducing an increase in the quantity of timber harvested in 
Country B” instead.328 Of course, “[t]he magnitude of these 
effects depends on . . . how much the activity levels change in 
response to price changes . . . and on the degree of integration 
                                                          
 321. Olmsted, supra note 306, at 158. 
 322. See Cinnamon Carlarne, Notes from a Climate Change Pressure-
Cooker: Sub-Federal Attempts at Transformation Meet National Resistance in 
the USA, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1351, 1355, 1371 (2008) (discussing uniformity and 
economies of scale as traditional justifications for environmental regulation at 
the federal level, and applying these principals to regional approaches to 
climate change). 
 323. Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits Of 
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1967 (2007). 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. at 1967–68. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 1968. 
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of world markets for the relevant goods and services.”329 
Second, “restrictions on emissions in Country A could induce 
emissions-intensive industries to uproot and relocate facilities 
to unregulated Country B” for cost-savings reasons.330 Third, 
[t]he “slack off” effect is a response to changing national net benefits. 
In the absence of a treaty, Country A might undertake some 
abatement, just to the point where its (small) domestic share of the 
global marginal benefits equals its domestic marginal costs of 
abatement. Country B would do likewise. But if Country A begins to 
abate its own emissions more aggressively, some additional global 
protection would be obtained, and the marginal benefit to Country B 
of its own abatement efforts would be diminished slightly (on the 
standard assumption of diminishing marginal benefits of protection), 
so that the domestically rational degree of abatement in Country B 
would fall. Hence, as some states emit less, other states rationally 
emit more.331 
The leakage considerations apply to both the global regime 
and to the United States system if regulations are taken at the 
subnational level without coherence provided by federal 
umbrella provisions.332 Whereas these considerations are 
important and must be addressed in the development of future 
localized climate solutions, they should not be allowed stop or 
slow down the currently necessary development of the area. 
V. THE STATUS: IS IT WORTH PURSUING CLIMATE 
CHANGE ACTION AT THE LOCALIZED LEVEL? 
This section will apply the above factors for determining 
the possible success of climate change programs to the 
described initiatives in order to analyze whether action at the 
subnational level already is or is likely to become successful as 
seen from both the procedural and the substantive points of 
view. For the sake of brevity, and to follow the scholastic 
benchmarks for success set forth above, the factors are grouped 
into the “actor” and “substance” categories. The “actor” analysis 
will ascertain whether there is a risk that program leaders 
have too much discretion, whether public participation is 
required, whether corporations are involved, and whether 
polycentric action, in general, forms a part of the programs. 
The “substance” analysis will establish whether any promising 
on-the-ground indicators or results can currently be identified, 
                                                          
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. at 1968–69. 
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whether program goals operate within a sufficiently narrow 
timeframe, and how the initiatives plan to meet their goals. 
A. ACTION AT THE PRIVATE, VOLUNTARY LEVEL: CRAGS AND THE 
NUDGE THEORY 
This article has examined CRAGs as an example of a 
bottom-up solution initiated without any government mandates 
or interaction, but with self-imposed compliance 
enforcement.333 Such voluntary NGO action has, at least until 
recently, been widely touted as a promising possibility for 
success, especially since government units remain as reluctant 
to act as they do.334 However, the answer to whether such 
action will suffice in relation to climate-change action, must, on 
balance, be “no.” 
First, CRAG actors are not powerful enough.335 While the 
“Who” test referenced above mentions concern over 
authoritative program leaders with unfettered discretion over 
action,336 experience shows the opposite: the CRAG programs 
tend to be led by peers who must agree upon what action to 
take and how to reach the goals.337 Where such unity is 
laudable in theory, clearer top-down leadership must also be a 
part of successful programs.338 Within the CRAG scheme, 
however, this vital component appears to be lacking.339 
Additionally, participation by distinct groups of actors is 
                                                          
 333. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 334. See Boyd Cohen, U.S. NGOs that are Moving the Needle on Climate 
Change, TRIPLEPUNDIT.COM (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.triplepundit.com/ 
2011/03/ngos-moving-needle-climate-change/ (“[T]here are so many NGOs 
doing powerful work to make the low-carbon shift at local, regional, national 
and international levels . . . .”). 
 335. HOWELL,  supra note 30, at 4, 11–12, 14–15 (discussing CRAG 
problems such as inactivity of members, manipulating carbon quotas by giving 
children their full quota while they really need less, and ability or willingness 
of  members to pay carbon quota fines voluntarily). 
 336. Olmsted, supra note 306, at 258. 
 337. See HOWELL, supra note 30, at 3–4 (discussing that CRAGs are really 
“groups formed to encourage members to reduce their carbon footprints” by 
holding themselves accountable). 
 338. Cf. Richard W. Scholl, Leader Behavior and Motivation, U.R.I., 
http://www.uri.edu/research/lrc/scholl/webnotes/Leadership_Behavior.htm 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (“Effective leadership is viewed by most people as 
fundamental to the success of any organization.”). 
 339. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 23–27. 
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limited.340 CRAGs serve only private interest groups whereas 
polycentric action typically includes interaction among 
government units, corporations, in addition to private interest 
groups.341 
Second, the most important problem in connection with the 
substance of the CRAG initiative is the apparent lack of 
continued or renewed activity among participants.342 This is 
unfortunate given that some CRAGers have reduced their 
carbon footprint by up to 27% in the first year of operations.343 
With continued participation, these groups could attain 
substantively far-reaching goals of up to 10% GHG reductions 
per annum.344 
On the other hand, while continued participation may be 
lacking,345 there are promising aspects of CRAGs. For one, at 
least some people accept fines in binding GHG-reduction 
schemes.346 Where some governments have not yet adopted 
such penalties, acquiescence to self-imposed fines among CRAG 
members could be comparatively noteworthy for lawmakers.347 
However, how broadly such an enforcement scheme would be 
accepted by civil society not only in the United Kingdom, but 
especially in the more heavily emitting nations such as the 
United States, is beyond the scope of this article.  Suffice it to 
say, fines imposed upon private individuals for exceeding 
carbon rations would undoubtedly meet with resistance in 
many places.348  The CRAG scheme also illustrates how laws 
                                                          
 340. Cf. Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate 
Change 35 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 5095, 2009) (“[M]ultiple benefits 
are created by diverse actions at multiple scales.”). 
 341. See id. at 4 (“To solve climate change in the long run, the day-to-day 
activities of individuals, families, firms, communities, and governments at 
multiple levels—particularly those in the more developed world—will need to 
change substantially.”). 
 342. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 23–28. 
 343. Id. at 18–19. 
 344. Id. at 11. 
 345. Id. at 23–28. 
 346. Id. at 13 (“Of the 24 ‘active’ CRAGs listed on the website, 14 definitely 
have a financial penalty for exceeding the carbon target, ranging from 2p to 
10p per kilogram . . .”). 
 347. But see AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, DEP’T OF SUSTAINABILITY, ENV’T, WATER, 
POPULATION & COMMUNITIES, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
ARRANGEMENTS FOR SYNTHETIC GREENHOUSE GASES 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.environment.gov.au/atmosphere/ozone/sgg/equivalentcarbonprice/p
ublications/pubs/fs8-ecp-compliance.pdf. 
 348. HOWELL, supra note 30, at 13 (“The idea of a fine for going above a 
certain amount was thought that it would put potential members off.”). 
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that are seen as sound from a personal and social perspective 
will meet with greater acceptance than those that are not.349  It 
is thus important to continue to bring attention to the potential 
threats associated with climate change to garner broad support 
for legislation.350 Focus on the threat of climate change, 
however, has regrettably been decreasing in recent years.351 
Outside of CRAGs and climate change, private action 
without government mandate has, by way of comparison, been 
promoted under such names as the “nudge theory.”352 
Described by the authors as “libertarian paternalism,”353 the 
nudge theory was popularized by law professor Cass Sunstein 
and economist Richard Thaler in their recent book on how to 
influence private behavior without offering financial incentives 
or imposing government sanctions.354 Similarly, Christiana 
Figueres has also recently called for private citizens to “assume 
responsibility” for climate change, although she did not 
specifically label her call a “nudge.”355 For a policy to be a 
nudge, it has to involve changing our physical or social 
environment in a way that does not restrict our choices or 
change financial incentives.356 For example, successes in 
behavioral change through nudges may include attitudes 
                                                          
 349. See id. at 23 (“[I]nterviewees from WSP mentioned increased 
awareness and understanding of their emissions as benefits of being involved 
in the scheme . . .”). WSP is a geographically dispersed CRAG. See id. 
 350. Cf. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elite, Social Movements, and the Law: The 
Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1447 (2005) (discussing 
how public awareness and media were used to effectively lobby affirmative-
action legislation). 
 351. Rob Jordan, Support for Climate Change Action Drops, Stanford Poll 
Finds, STAN. NEWS (May 8, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/ 
may/climate-change-survey-050812.html. 
 352. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (Yale Univ. 
Press 2008) (describing the nudge theory). 
 353. Id. at 5 (defining libertarianism as “liberty-preserving” with the aim of 
not burdening those who want to exercise their freedom and “paternalism” as 
trying to influence people’s behavior and choices in directions that will make 
choosers better off, as judged by themselves). 
 354. See generally id. 
 355. Karl Ritter, Christiana Figueres, UN Climate Chief, Says Individuals 
Need to ‘Assume Responsibility’ to Address Problem, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 
30, 2012, 7:38 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/30/christiana-
figueres-un_n_2217056.html. 
 356. Baroness Julia Neuberger, Why a Nudge is Not Enough to Change 
Behaviour, BBC NEWS (July 18, 2011, 8:54 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/health-14186806. 
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towards smoking reduction,357 taking shorter showers,358 
turning off lights when leaving a room,359 attitudes towards 
eating healthily,360 and discouraging intoxicated driving.361 
Examples of nudges within the environmental field include the 
use of thermostats that state the cost per hour of increasing or 
decreasing room temperatures.362 A company has already 
designed a relatively inexpensive unit that wirelessly connects 
to a home’s energy meter and displays electricity usage in 
watts or money.363 A blue glow indicates that less electricity 
than usual is being used; a red glow means the opposite.364  
This is considered more helpful in effectuating actual change 
among consumers than are more lofty informational 
campaigns.365 Other countries, such as Japan, Great Britain, 
and France, also seem to be endorsing the “nudge” approach.366 
These countries display, or are planning to display, a product’s 
carbon footprint on product labeling in order to raise public 
awareness about global warming.367 Perhaps most indicatively, 
                                                          
 357. Jonathan Ball, Nudge Tactics No “Magic Bullet,” BBC NEWS (Sept. 6, 
2012, 11:40 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-19506608. 
 358. See, e.g., Take Shorter Showers, BOS. U. SUSTAINABILITY, 
http://www.bu.edu/sustainability/what-you-can-do/ten-sustainable-
actions/take-shorter-showers/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2013). 
 359. See,  e.g., When to Turn Off Your Lights, ENERGY.GOV (Aug. 30, 2012, 
7:53 PM), http://energy.gov/energysaver/articles/when-turn-your-lights. 
 360. See, e.g., Eat Healthy, LETSMOVE.GOV, http://www.letsmove.gov/eat-
healthy (last visited Feb. 7, 2013). 
 361. See,  e.g., Five Minutes or Less for Health Weekly Tip: Don’t Drink and 
Drive, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/family/minutes/tips/dontdrinkanddrive/ 
index.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2013). 
 362. See generally Smarthours Questions and Answers, OGE.COM, 
http://www.oge.com/residential-customers/products-and-services/Pages/ 
SmartHours.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (detailing a thermostat program 
that shows energy cost savings). 
 363. Id.; Ambient: Information at a Glance, AMBIENT DEVICES, 
http://www.ambientdevices.com/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2013). 
 364. THALER &  SUNSTEIN, supra note 352, at 194. 
 365. See generally VINCENT P. GAMBAL, PUBLIC INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS: 
AN APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF REASONED ACTION (1990), available at 
http://www.udel.edu/communication/web/thesisfiles/gambalthesis.pdf 
(discussing the range of effectiveness on informational campaigns as relatively 
effective to completely ineffective). 
 366. See Britain Shapes Good Citizens with a Gentle ‘Nudge,’  JAPAN TIMES 
(Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/02/04/world/britain-
shapes-good-citizens-with-a-gentle-nudge/#.URQsLmdhW8A; Carbon 
Footprint Labels are Spreading, NUDGE BLOG (Aug. 21, 2008), 
http://nudges.org/2008/08/21/carbon-footprint-labels-are-spreading/ 
[hereinafter Carbon Footprint Labels]. 
 367. See  Carbon Footprint Labels, supra note 366. 
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the Sacramento Municipal Water District uses a simple, 
reader-friendly Home Electricity Report that specifies how the 
users’ energy use compares with that of both their “efficient 
neighbors” (“those that fall under a specified standard”) and 
“all neighbors.”368 This report ranks people’s energy use “as 
great, good, or below average (with one smiley face for good, 
and two for great).”369 Furthermore, these users are “shown 
how their own [energy] use compares with that of their efficient 
neighbors [by] percentages and bar charts. (‘Last month, you 
used 40 percent more electricity than your efficient 
neighbors.)”370 Finally, customers are shown in big letters how 
much money they are paying per year as a result of their 
possible inefficiency (“At today’s rates this COSTS YOU 
ABOUT $358 PER YEAR”).371 Additionally, and importantly, 
“consumers are also given ‘personalized [energy-saving] tips’ 
that are specifically ‘based on [their] energy use and housing 
profile’” (such as unplugging appliances, smart purchases, and 
investments in maintenance of heating/cooling systems).372 In 
this manner, specific and realistic energy-saving options may 
aid climate change goals more than common factual messages 
such as “stop flying” or “help save the environment,” as is often 
displayed on hotel room signs asking patrons to consider 
reusing towels instead of having them washed, which are 
considered less effective.373 
Although nudge theory is an appealing and promising idea, 
it may be necessary to simply “force,” not just nudge, action 
against climate change whether through legal and/or financial 
methods such as carbon taxes or tax credits. Indeed, the 
authors of Nudge recognize the “status quo bias,” where, in 
general, people “have a more general tendency to stick with 
their current situation.”374 This may explain the inability to 
instigate present-day action within climate change, which is 
still largely seen as a “future” problem. In contrast, the ozone 
                                                          
 368. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS 259 (Penguin Books 
2009). 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. 
 373. E.g., Andrews, supra note 103, at 43 (discussing CRAGs as a 
“practical implementation of a well-researched policy”). 
 374. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 352, at 34–35. 
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depletion problem, arguably initiated a greater willingness to 
act due to the problem’s here-and-now effect (fears at the time 
were of losing one’s eyesight due to the lack of a protective 
ozone layer).375 
The UK is one of the nations that, so far, has favored the 
“nudge,” approach to various problems, but a recent report by 
the British Government Committee concludes that nudges 
alone won’t work.376 It may be necessary to use a range of 
different policies, including government regulation.377 A recent 
poll, for example, found that “‘while recycling is widespread in 
America and 73% of those polled are paying bills online in order 
to save paper,’ only four percent had reduced their utility use 
and only three percent had purchased hybrid cars.”378 Although 
this a step in the right direction, it is not enough: “Given a 
hundred years, you could conceivably change lifestyles enough 
to matter—but time is precisely what we lack.”379 Professor 
Lord John Krebs concurs in findings presented at a recent 
British Science Festival: nudges are successful in some areas, 
but not always.380 They should not be regarded as a “get out of 
jail free” card by governments wishing to avoid tougher 
approaches like regulation or taxation.381 Instead, a 
combination of approaches—social nudging, regulation, 
taxation, and investment—may be most effective in relation to 
time sensitive problems such as climate change.382 
In short, action at the purely private level will not suffice 
to solve the climate change problem.  If privately initiated 
programs were interfaced with programs with more binding 
authority and resources, their success rate would have 
potential to increase. 
 
                                                          
 375. See Ozone Depletion—Why It’s a Problem, ECOEVALUATOR.COM, 
http://www.ecoevaluator.com/environment/air-quality/ozone-depletion.html 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013). 
 376. Neuberger, supra note 356 (“[F]or the most important problems facing 
us at the moment, the science says that ‘nudging’ won’t be enough.”). 
 377. Id. 
 378. McKibben, supra note 13, at 56. 
 379. Id. 
 380. See Amy Richards, The Nudge Debate—A Strategic Approach Gets 
Results, DIVACREATIVE.COM (Sept. 2012), http://www.divacreative.com/blog/ 
the-nudge-debate-a-strategic-approach-gets-results/. 
 381. Ball, supra note 357. 
 382. Id. 
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B. ACTION AT THE CITY LEVEL: EU COVENANT OF MAYORS AND 
GREENCLIMATECITIES383 
Action at the city level appears to be the most promising of 
the initiatives analyzed here. From a positive angle, because 
the programs constitute cooperation among cities equally 
situated within the programs, the risk of actors that are “too” 
powerful from an organizational point of view does not appear 
to be a problem.384 Nonetheless, one may fear that some cities 
may, over time, capture the de facto leadership of these 
programs—whether for altruistic or more self-focused 
reasons—and thus obtain inexpediently strong leadership roles 
vis-à-vis other cities. This concern should, however, be 
addressed internally through proper procedural preventative 
measures. The following comparison between the EU Covenant 
of Mayors and GreenClimateCities explains why. 
The EU Covenant of Mayors attempts to motivate civil 
society to cooperate with the member cities in developing action 
plans.385 This seems to be a procedurally sound practice. In 
contrast, GreenClimateCities does not seem to emphasize public 
participation in its documentation.386 The program is still new, 
so, giving it the benefit of the doubt, the correction of these 
issues may well be in the pipeline, which would be desirable for 
the reasons established above. The EU Covenant of Mayors 
attempts to share information with other territorial units, and 
thus to undertake at least some, albeit not much, polycentric 
action.387 The focus on territories, however, seems to indicate 
that the Covenant does not plan to involve Public-Interest 
NGOs (PINGOs) or Business-Interest NGOs (BINGOs) to a 
significant extent in its work. When the research for this article 
                                                          
 383. The MCPA has purposefully been omitted from this section due to the 
organization’s lack in updating commitments at the end of 2012 when this 
article was written. 
 384. This of course remains a concern at the individual city level, where 
mayors may have relatively large amounts of power depending on the 
democratic design in question. Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 31) 
(discussing how public participation helps to avoid “ivory tower decisions”). In 
the climate context, however, “strong” mayors have helped the agenda 
forward, such as in the cases of  New York and Seattle. See id. (manuscript at 
56–58, 67–76); U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, supra 
note 202. 
 385. See TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 89. 
 386. See generally GREENCLIMATECITIES, supra note 222. 
 387. TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE, supra note 89, at 4. 
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was concluded, GreenClimateCities did not mention any type of 
polycentric cooperation in its materials beyond the obvious 
cooperation among the governance members themselves.388 
Cities or other governmentally established geographical units 
will thus be the only responsible parties under both the EU 
Covenant and the GreenClimateCities programs. But 
polycentric action is a recognized benchmark of success, 
especially if both business- and public-interest NGOs are 
involved in the same programs.389 This consideration could also 
be applied to the city level and should thus be taken into 
account for greater possibilities of effectiveness and 
inclusiveness in city coalition programs. 
Substantively, the EU Covenant of Mayors program 
appears to be promising. The 20% reductions goal by 2020 is 
positive.390 However, it is important to remember that, by 
definition, this goal only accounts for one-fifth of the total effort 
required by the EU, thus still leaving no less than four-fifths of 
the goal to be accomplished by non-members, including many 
rural areas. Although some less urbanized areas such as 
counties and metropolitan districts have joined the initiative, 
members are typically towns, cities, and other relatively 
urbanized areas.391 Given the fact that most sources of CO2 
(i.e., power plants, companies, and urban residents) are found 
in urban areas, one would have hoped that by now, the 
umbrella goals of such urban areas would have reached farther 
than the arguably still meager 20%. At the same time, it should 
be remembered that other official and unofficial programs also 
overlap with or compare to the Covenant.392 This patchwork 
situation is not ideal as it is not only difficult to overview, but 
also creates risks that gaps exist and remain unnoticed in what 
should ideally be an all-encompassing blanket.393 Nonetheless, 
it is promising that clear reductions goals have been announced 
under the EU Covenant, that these goals will not be met solely 
or mainly by cap-and-trade programs but by actual emissions 
reductions, that there is a specific year for goal fulfillment that 
is not too distant, and that the program is spreading to other 
                                                          
 388. See generally GREENCLIMATECITIES, supra note 222. 
 389. See generally Ostrom, supra note 340. 
 390. See TOWARDS A LOWER CARBON FUTURE, supra note 90, at 3. 
 391. COVENANT OF MAYORS, 4286 SIGNATORIES (2013), available at 
http://www.eumayors.eu/covenant_signatories.pdf. 
 392. See TOWARDS A LOWER CARBON FUTURE, supra note 90, at 6. 
 393. Sheenan & Carr, supra note 265, at 12. 
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parts of the world than just the EU. It is also noteworthy that 
some EU actors are willing to exceed the established targets.394 
This compares favorably to the ClimateSavers program under 
which some corporations employ similar “stretch targets” that 
ask them to go further than what they originally thought they 
could and bodes well for quasi-voluntary action.395 In contrast, 
the goals and enforcement methods of the GreenClimateCities 
are somewhat unclear at this point in time.396 
In short, action against climate change at the city level is 
promising. Most importantly though, climate change programs 
should be considered against the risk of overcrowding by a 
proliferation of too many patchwork programs and actors, most 
of whom invariably claim to have the best solution(s) to the 
problem and be the next leaders of action at the sub-national, 
sub-state level. It would instead be preferable if larger 
government units and supranational organizations would      
(re-)enter the scene to cooperate and otherwise interface 
legislatively, practically, and politically with the city actors. 
This is so because there are, as amply demonstrated elsewhere, 
many roles that only such larger units can undertake or that 
they are best positioned to undertake.397 Importantly here, 
larger governance units can create and enforce umbrella action 
goals, which could help alleviate the above-mentioned problem 
of overcrowding.398 Further, deeper and broader involvement by 
state, national, and supranational actors would not only lend 
more force to the regime in general, but also more credibility to 
                                                          
 394. Covenant of Mayors News, COVENANT OF MAYORS, http://www. 
covenantofmayors.eu/index_en.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (“By their 
commitment, Covenant signatories aim to meet and exceed the European 
Union 20% CO2 reduction objective by 2020.”). 
 395. WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE, THE CLIMATE SAVERS PROGRAMME: 
HOW CORPORATIONS CAN SAVE THE CLIMATE 19 (2007) [hereinafter THE 
CLIMATE SAVERS PROGRAMME], available at http://awsassets.panda.org/ 
downloads/cs_web_version_may2008_1.pdf (“The reductions–described within 
the company as ‘stretch targets’ will be achieved through a mix of energy 
efficiency and renewable energy projects carried out at Novo Nordisk 
operations globally.”). 
 396. See generally GREENCLIMATECITIES, supra note 222. 
 397. Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 18–19). 
 398. See generally NATIONAL ACTION PLAN: COMMUNICATIONS UMBRELLA  
(2011), available at http://www.demandresponsesmartgrid.org/Resources/ 
Documents/NAP%20Docs/NAPC%20Action%20Guide%20Part%201%2011.07.0
7.pdf. 
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action taken in cooperation with actors at lower levels.399 
Cities have demonstrated the potential for innovative and 
effective action within areas other than climate change. For 
example, the San Francisco ban on free plastic grocery bags has 
spread to such cities as Los Angeles, California;400 Toronto, 
Canada;401 and Delhi, India.402 Other cities, such as Santa Fe, 
New Mexico, are considering the ban as well.403 Many 
jurisdictions—seventy in California alone—have approved bans 
on polystyrene cups and food containers.404 
New York City adopted a more controversial ban on the 
sale of large-sized sodas for health reasons.405 The long-term 
viability and success of New York City’s ban remains to be seen 
as it was recently declared invalid and an appeal is pending.406 
However, it still bodes well for climate change governance that 
effective legislative and other action does spring up at the city 
level, even when not required by state or national bodies. 
                                                          
 399. See Tiffany Stecker, Adaptation: Companies Tackle ‘Weird Water’ 
Risks Head-On, EENEWS.NET (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/ 
public/climatewire/2012/09/04/2 (discussing how the SEC findings were able to 
“lend credibility” to climate risk companies). 
 400. Plastic Bag Ban, supra note 3. 
 401. Michael Lauzon, Plastic Bag Manufacturers Take Legal Action 
Against Toronto Bag Ban, PLASTICSNEWS.COM (Nov. 20, 2012, 12:25 PM), 
http://www.plasticsnews.com/headlines2.html?id=27079&channel=450. 
 402. Tyler Falk, Delhi Imposes Complete Ban of Plastic Bags, SMART 
PLANET (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/cities/ 
delhi-imposes-complete-ban-of-plastic-bags/5192. 
 403. Telephone Interview with Katherine Mortimer, Programs Manager, 
Sustainable Santa Fe with Myanna Dellinger, Assistant Professor of Law, W. 
State Coll. of Law (Aug. 16, 2012); see also Solid Waste Reduction, Sustainable 
Santa Fe, SANTA FE 400, http://www.santafenm.gov/index.aspx?NID=1367 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (“Seek funding to develop a reusable bag, with the 
option of stores adding their logo, along with a ‘Sustainable Santa Fe’ logo, to 
encourage bag reuse. This can be combined with an ordinance restricting free 
bag distribution from stores.”). 
 404. See Wendy Koch, Cities Have ‘Tidal Wave’ of Bans on Foam 
Containers, USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 2012, at A3. 
 405. Daniel Engber, Fuzzy and Fizzy: The Contested Science Behind 
Bloomberg’s Ban on Large-Sized Sodas, SLATE.COM (Sept. 13, 2012, 1:15PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2012/06/bloomberg_b
ans_large_sized_soda_the_science_behind_the_decision_.html. However, this 
ban is controversial and may not go into effect. See NYC Soda Ban Rejected: 
Judge Strikes Down Limit on Large Sugary Drinks as ‘Arbitrary, Capricious,’ 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 11, 2013, 11:46 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2013/03/11/nyc-soda-ban-dismissed-judge-large-sugary-
drinks_n_2854563.html. 
 406. Michael Howard Saul, Judge Cans Soda Ban, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 
2013, at A19. 
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C. ACTION AT THE ESTABLISHED NGO-LEVEL: CLIMATE SAVERS 
Environmental discourse often laments the lack of 
corporate involvement in non-governmentally mandated 
climate change solutions.407 The Climate Savers program is an 
example of how corporations do, in some instances, voluntarily 
involve themselves in climate work.408 The program is also an 
example, at least in this instance, of how corporations take this 
a step further and cooperate successfully with a PINGO, 
namely the WWF, which oversees Climate Savers.409 The 
BINGO-PINGO cooperation itself demonstrates a procedurally 
successful aspect of the program. This type of cross-sectoral 
NGO cooperation is very promising. 
Public participation—generally a hallmark of procedural 
success410—is not directly relevant to Climate Savers, at least 
not to the same extent as with government programs. This is 
because the Climate Savers program is by definition an 
initiative by and for the public, in this instance companies,411 
whereas the public participation concern centers more on 
traditional governance units.412 Of course, expanded 
cooperation with government entities at any level and with 
other PINGOs or BINGOs would be desirable. 
On the other hand, a concern when measuring the success 
of environmental programs is, as always, whether 
implementing or other leading actors may become too powerful 
in relation to other internal and external actors.413 The Climate 
Savers program brings forward this concern. The program 
membership includes corporate giants with the potential for 
paving the way in positive, but arguably also in negative, 
ways.414 Most environmentally interested stakeholders appear 
to share the concern that with the large amount of corporate 
resources, and thus potential for leverage possessed by the type 
of companies involved in programs such as Climate Savers, 
comes the risk of excessive influence both within the program 
and externally. In the United States, corporations are widely 
                                                          
 407. See supra note 301 and accompanying text. 
 408. See supra Part III.B. 
 409. Id. 
 410. See supra Part IV.A. 
 411. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 412. See Dellinger, supra note 1 (manuscript at 29–30). 
 413. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 414. See supra text accompanying note 167. 
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considered to have already “captured” many government 
units.415 This concern also applies to the private organizational 
level where leadership could similarly be captured by the 
strongest actors. After the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,416 
fears that corporations can and do yield excessive powers—not 
only within certain circles such as the groups of which they are 
members, but also in society at large—are certainly not 
shrinking.417 After environmental scandals such as the BP 
disaster, the fear of corporations proclaiming to be 
environmentally “friendly,” only to actually remain on a 
traditional profits-above-everything-else course, remains very 
real.418 
The risk, as demonstrated in Part IV.A, is one of unfettered 
discretion. In the Climate Savers network, it does not appear 
that any given corporation enjoys disproportionately broad 
powers in relation to other members or to the program 
leadership. However, civil society’s general concern that with 
“leadership” and prominence comes the risk of negative 
dominance is understandable. It is a concern that Climate 
Savers should address with external stakeholders for a greater 
level of approval among, in particular, non-corporate 
stakeholders in the climate process at large. On balance, 
however, it is fair to consider Climate Savers a procedural 
success because of, in particular, its PINGO/BINGO interface, 
the reliable nature of the oversight and well-established NGO, 
and the clear processes for goal-fulfillment.419 
Climate Savers also appears substantively promising. In 
particular, the program’s use of stretch targets indicates a 
corporate awareness that more action—and not the resistance 
for which many corporations are notorious in the climate 
context—is needed to achieve substantively successful climate 
                                                          
 415. See, e.g., Robert A.G. Monks, The Corporate Capture of the United 
States,  HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 5, 2012, 
10:21 AM), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/01/05/the-corporate-
capture-of-the-united-states/ (“The financial power of American corporations 
now controls every stage of politics—legislative, executive, and ultimately 
judicial.”). 
 416. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 417. See Jill Greenfield, Experts Assess Impact of Citizens United, HARV. 
GAZETTE (Feb. 3, 2012), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2012/02/ 
experts-assess-impact-of-citizens-united/. 
 418. See supra notes 55–58, 197 and accompanying text. 
 419. See supra Part III.B. 
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goals.420 Further, companies have already achieved two-digit 
reduction percentages while the Kyoto Protocol was operating 
with single-digit reduction percentage figures, at least until 
very recently.421 It is also noteworthy that these companies 
have achieved their reductions while increasing corporate sales 
growth, even in today’s financially very difficult 
circumstances.422 The fact that not insignificant emissions 
reductions are well underway at the voluntary, corporate level 
is a substantive success, as is the program’s focus on third-
party compliance review.423 
In short, it is worth pursuing voluntary action at the 
BINGO level, although some risk factors exist. Cynics will 
point out that companies may simply participate in programs 
such as Climate Savers because of public relations advantages, 
the potential for corporate savings, the risk of shareholder 
hostility and potential lawsuits if not taking action, or because 
companies realize that regulations appear inevitable in the 
long run.424 At any rate, it cannot reasonably be disputed that, 
regardless of motivation, it is positive that some action is taken 
by the corporate world. Broader, more far-reaching corporate 
action would be even better. However, the fact that many large 
and well-known companies cooperate with Climate Savers has 
the potential to create a trend that other perhaps more 
resistant companies will not be able to avoid in the long run for 
a variety of reasons. In combination with the pressure exerted 
by city, and hopefully soon national and international 
governance units, there may be grounds for hope that 
companies will soon form a larger active part of possible 
solution to the climate change challenge. 
D. MULTI-SECTOR ACTION: THE CLIMATE REGISTRY 
Reliable, accurate, and transparent carbon accounting and 
registration are necessary for progress against climate change 
at any front. Third-party oversight lends necessary credibility 
                                                          
 420. THE CLIMATE SAVERS PROGRAMME, supra note 395, at 19; supra notes 
172–73 and accompanying text. 
 421. See supra notes 60, 189 and accompanying text. 
 422. For example, Johnson & Johnson simultaneously surpassed a 
reduction target while increasing sales growth in 2010. Supra notes 188–90 
and accompanying text. 
 423. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
 424. See supra notes 180–86 and accompanying text. 
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to carbon reduction programs and allows for future 
enforcement based on data that is accessible and verifiable by 
the overseeing bodies. Because of the highly technical and 
global nature of the underlying problem, uniform or at least 
comparable standards are necessary. The Climate Registry is 
one example of a platform for addressing these concerns. It 
demonstrates the possibilities for successful interaction among 
city, state, federal, and tribal government entities as well as 
across to civil society represented via BINGOs and/or PINGOs. 
The program also is an example of how programs may 
expand from purely voluntary, bottom-up action to having 
regulatory implications if or when governments start requiring 
the type of service that programs such as the Climate Registry 
provide.425 Vertical and horizontal cooperation among 
government and civil society actors is key in the environmental 
arena as well as more broadly. The Climate Registry 
exemplifies the possibilities of such cooperation. Where this can 
be expanded to the international level, such as is likely in the 
case of the Climate Registry, the potential for success also 
expands. But the risk of overcrowding also exists when it comes 
to carbon registration. In the United States, both the Climate 
Registry and the EPA provide registration options.426 The 
carbonn Cities Climate Registry offers registration options 
internationally.427 
Ironically, polycentric, bottom-up action is necessary to 
truly move the climate change agenda forward, while at the 
same time too much bottom-up action poses separate risks. 
Nonetheless, this is the reality—“too much” of something is not 
good, but neither is “too little.” A reliable, workable, and 
trustworthy medium needs to be developed. This medium must 
allow for a healthy amount of competition among program 
solutions, perhaps even when it comes to registries. Time, 
government action or inaction, public opinion, and the 
marketplace will contribute to finding workable solutions. In 
the meantime, actors with power to move the development in 
the qualitative right direction should be aware of pitfalls posed 
by focusing too narrowly on success for their own programs 
only. These actors should also—as arguably is the case 
already—consider the benefits of synergism between programs 
on at least the international level where registries can co-exist, 
                                                          
 425. See supra Part III.D. 
 426. See supra notes 268, 73 and accompanying text. 
 427. See supra notes 224–27 and accompanying text. 
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even if this may not be the case at the national levels for 
reasons of competition. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Climate change requires imminent action from as many 
angles as possible. No one single solution is sufficiently 
promising at this very late point in time. However, this much is 
clear: waiting for national-level and supranational-level actors 
to take substantively effective action in broad agreement with a 
majority of other similarly situated actors is like waiting for 
Godot—unlikely to happen, at least at an early enough point in 
time. This article posits that local initiatives currently present 
the most promising course of action for effective climate change 
solutions. The article analyzes subnational, substate programs 
with either no enforcement methods, limited methods, or 
traditional methods. Of such local initiatives, the most 
promising sources of procedural and substantive success are 
those that are not scaled down to the purely private level, but 
rather include involvement and oversight by somewhat larger 
and more well-established bodies such as city coalitions or 
recognized NGOs. Traditional law enforcement is not an 
indispensable component of effective local climate change 
initiatives; other modernly recognized methods of alternative 
compliance securement can, if used correctly, be just as or even 
more viable. 
Opponents of local action may argue that there is no time 
for local action within climate change. The response to this is 
that there is only time for this. Although action by and an 
interface to larger-scale governance units is still desirable if it 
could be obtained, experience shows that we must look to 
nontraditional actors to continue to step up climate-change 
action to meet the climate challenge in the timeframe called for 
by scientists. This is even more evident after the parties to the 
climate change treaty negotiations under the UNFCCC regime 
failed to agree on a broadly accepted renewal of the expired 
Kyoto Protocol to take immediate effect, but instead only 
reached an agreement that a second legally binding agreement 
should be developed, adopted, and take effect by 2020.428 One 
can hope that such an agreement will be drafted, but with the 
uncertainties that abound in relation to what, after all, 
                                                          
 428. Arup, supra note 64. 
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amounts to mere hopes for a future that nobody can predict, 
this is far from certain to be the case.429 In fact, the discussions 
only weakened the second commitment period of the already too 
modest Kyoto Protocol since the few parties who adopted 
secondary binding emissions cuts by 2020 only account for 
approximately 15% of global emissions.430 It seems impossible 
to reach a broad and sufficiently deep solution by all parties to 
the UNFCCC. On that scale, only narrower solutions such as 
“clubs” of countries with a much more limited membership and 
shared interests seems to be the best hope. 
Climatologists continue to warn of a tipping point after 
which the world is unlikely to be able to reverse unforeseeable, 
but in all likelihood extreme and dangerous effects of climate 
change.431 However, we may also reach a much more positive 
tipping point—one at which action by a yet relatively small 
amount of participants reaches such a critical mass that 
effective climate change reduction becomes the order of the day 
and not mere rhetoric about what could be. At that point in 
time, the law of the few will be the law of the many.432 
                                                          
 429. Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments, supra note 62. 
 430. See Ritter & Casey, supra note 63. 
 431. POJANATH BHATANACHAROEN ET AL., THE TIPPING POINT OF THE 
‘TIPPING POINT’ METAPHOR: AGENCY AND PROCESS FOR WAVES OF CHANGE 1 
(2004), available at http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ihrr/tippingpoints/OLKC 
PaperforIHRR.pdf. The  tipping point is defined as follows: 
The term ‘tipping point’ in its most basic meaning refers to a critical 
point when unprecedented changes occur rapidly with irreversible 
effect. It entered the academic lexicon when it was used by the 
political scientist Morton Grodzins in 1957 in his sociological studies 
on racial segregation to describe the critical threshold at which point 
the white population would leave an area where more and more black 
people were present. 
Id. at 1. The phrase was coined by analogy to physics where “[a]dding a small 
amount of weight to a balanced object can cause it to suddenly and completely 
topple.” Mark Heley, The Global Tipping Point, NETPLACES.COM, http://www. 
netplaces.com/guide-to-2012/the-chaos-point-and-the-noosphere/the-global-
tipping-point.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). Heley further defines the 
tipping point as when “change in a complex system becomes unstoppable. This 
tends to happen quickly and abruptly, rather than gradually and 
incrementally.” Id. However, the phrase “the tipping point” was more widely 
popularized by Malcolm Gladwell’s 2000 bestseller. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE 
TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 19 (1st ed. 
2000). Gladwell defines the “tipping point” as “the moment of critical mass, the 
threshold, the boiling point,” at which changes within society, businesses, and 
science become irreversible. Id. at 12. 
 432. The notion of “a tiny percentage of people do[ing] the majority of the 
work” is what economists call the 80/20 principle. GLADWELL, supra note 431,  
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Hopefully, that tipping point is right around the corner. 
Anything else would be unacceptable. 
 
                                                          
at 19. This principle describes the notion that “in any situation roughly 80 
percent of the ‘work’ will be done by 20 percent of the participants.” Id. 
